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INTRODUCTION 
ETHODOLOGICAL individualism—the approach to analyzing 
and explaining social phenomena through individual behavior—
is without doubt the dominant way of understanding copyright law to-
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day.1 In its origins and early development, Anglo-American copyright 
law came to revolve around the normative idea of the individual “ro-
mantic genius,” whose creative expression was worthy of protection 
against copying.2 Authorship was thus conceived of principally in indi-
vidualistic and solitary terms.3 As the analysis of copyright law became 
utilitarian and market driven, the individual author came to be concep-
tualized as a rational utility-maximizer, who was motivated to produce 
original expression through copyright’s promise of limited exclusivi-
ty.4 
Despite copyright’s reliance on methodological individualism to un-
derstand the author’s motivations and indeed the very concept of author-
ship, the creative process itself has long known the use of cooperative 
techniques and processes in the production of creative works.5 Principal 
among such methods of creative collaboration is the institution of coau-
thorship.6 While scholars disagree about the dominance and pervasive-
ness of coauthorship norms for various types of creative works during 
pre-copyright times, they nonetheless all agree that the institution exist-
ed as a common mechanism of cultural production by the time formal 
copyright law emerged in the early eighteenth century.7 And yet it was 
 
1 For a general account of methodological individualism in law and legal analysis, see 
Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 43, 48–57 
(2011). For general discussions of methodological individualism, see Leon J. Goldstein, The 
Inadequacy of the Principle of Methodological Individualism, 53 J. Phil. 801, 801–03 
(1956); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Meanings of Methodological Individualism, 14 J. Econ. 
Methodology 211, 211–12 (2007); Lars Udehn, The Changing Face of Methodological Indi-
vidualism, 28 Ann. Rev. Soc. 479, 479–80 (2002).  
2 See Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte’s Proof of the Illegality 
of Reprinting, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1847, 1847 (2011); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of 
Copyright: Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 462–63; Martha Wood-
mansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence 
of the “Author,” 17 Eighteenth-Century Stud. 425, 426 (1984). 
3 See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal 
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186, 188–89 (2008). 
4 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1569, 1573 (2009). For an account of copyright’s utilitarian turn as a normative theory, 
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative Structure of Copyright Law, in Intellectual 
Property and the Common Law 313, 313–15 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).  
5 See, e.g., Brian Vickers, Shakespeare, Co-Author: A Historical Study of Five Collabora-
tive Plays (2002); Heather Hirschfeld, Early Modern Collaboration and Theories of Author-
ship, 116 PMLA: Publications Modern Language Ass’n 609, 610–11, 620 (2001). 
6 See Hirschfeld, supra note 5, at 620. 
7 See Jeffrey Knapp, What is a Co-Author?, 89 Representations 1, 1–3, 5 (2005) (critiqu-
ing the orthodox historical position, but conceding that coauthorship existed in the seven-
teenth century). 
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not until a century and a half later that copyright law, on either side of 
the Atlantic, first wrestled with the institution of coauthorship and its 
implications for the working of copyright doctrine.8 When presented 
with a case of coauthorship in 1915, Judge Learned Hand was struck by 
this anomaly, and observed how he had “been able to find strangely little 
law” on the subject.9 The result was that through much of the twentieth 
century, it fell entirely to courts to develop copyright’s rules relating to 
coauthorship in incremental, common-law fashion. In the United States, 
it was not until the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 that the copy-
right statute even dealt with the institution of coauthorship.10 
At its simplest, coauthorship refers to a collective, cooperative pro-
cess of producing a work of original expression, wherein each contrib-
uting member (that is, each coauthor) makes a contribution to the work 
and is, as a result, accorded the designation of “author.” The designation 
offers more than just nominal value, since it also results in each coauthor 
obtaining an ownership interest in the copyright over the creative work, 
as a joint owner of the work.11 Coauthorship is thus of deep economic 
 
8 This was the case of Levy v. Rutley, (1871) 6 L.R.P.C. 523 at 523–25 (Eng.). Cases prior 
to this, and around this period, do mention joint authorship between parties, confirming that 
the institutional practice was well established by this period. Yet no case appears to have 
dealt directly with the process through which copyright was to recognize or validate the 
practice of jointly authoring a work. For cases mentioning joint authorship in the nineteenth 
century in both the United States and England, see Silver v. Holt, 84 F. 809, 810 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1895); Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325, 326 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1884); Tompkins v. Rankin, 24 
F. Cas. 39, 39 (C.C.D. Mass. 1876) (No. 14,090); Shook v. Rankin, 21 F. Cas. 1337, 1338–39 
(C.C.D. Minn. 1875) (No. 12,805); Ex parte La Mert, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 578 (K.B.) 578; 
Hole v. Bradbury, [1879] 12 Ch.D. 886, 886; see also Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of 
Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint Work Doctrine, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 43, 45–46 
(1997) (“[N]ineteenth-century judicial opinions show that courts assumed that joint author-
ship could be created, although their opinions did not specify how.”). 
9 Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).  
10 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (definition of 
“joint work”); see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “joint work). The first U.S. copy-
right statute, the Copyright Act of 1790, might have contemplated the institution of coau-
thorship. In delineating the rights of authors, it uses the phrase “author or authors” in multi-
ple places. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). Yet, the Act of 1790 made 
no special allowances for coauthorship, nor did it specify how such coauthorship was to be 
determined. Id. Somewhat ironically, the next U.S. copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 
1909, changed the statute’s approach and focused entirely on a singular “author” throughout. 
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); George D. Carey, Subcomm. on Pa-
tents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 
Copyright Law Revision, Study No. 12: Joint Ownership of Copyrights 89 (Comm. Print 
1960) [hereinafter Carey, Study No. 12].  
11 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). 
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significance, which explains why courts in the twentieth century were 
increasingly presented with coauthorship disputes, necessitating their 
creation of a set of rules to deal with the issue. 
In developing copyright’s rules on coauthorship, courts began by 
looking to the idea of an “agree[ment]” to collaborate between contribu-
tors, and thus inevitably situated their analyses within the framework of 
contract law.12 Contributing to the creation of a work in furtherance of 
an agreement to do so thus emerged as the paradigmatic case of coau-
thorship. This approach presented courts with few problems, if any, 
when the parties had explicitly agreed to collaborate and share author-
ship in advance of making their creative contributions. Problems arose 
however, in situations where an actual advance agreement between the 
parties was altogether absent, and yet the parties had gone ahead and 
collaborated in the creation of the work. To deny one or more contribu-
tors the designation of coauthor in such situations, merely because of the 
absence of a formal ex ante agreement, seemed at once unduly harsh and 
mechanistic. 
Thus emerged the idea of what I describe here as unplanned coau-
thorship. Instead of looking for a formal ex ante agreement between the 
parties prior to their collaboration, courts began looking to the very pro-
cess of collaboration and the parties’ behavior therein (as it unfolds dur-
ing the collaboration) in order to treat the parties as coauthors of the 
work, based entirely on their actions.13 The collaborative creativity 
here—the coauthorship—is “unplanned” only in the sense that it is not 
undertaken pursuant to a pre-concerted arrangement between the parties 
where they agree to their statuses and ownership rights over the final 
work. The use of the term unplanned is not to suggest that the parties 
were not consciously aware of their collaborative activity, or that it was 
motivated by a degree of spontaneity inconsistent with deliberate action. 
In this sense, unplanned coauthorship unquestionably always remains an 
intentional activity. 
 
12 See Levy, 6 L.R.P.C. at 529. 
13 For early cases developing this idea, see Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel 
Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944); Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 
1915); see also Therese M. Brady, Note, Manifest Intent and Copyrightability: The Destiny 
of Joint Authorship, 17 Fordham Urb. L.J. 257, 258 (1989) (detailing this emphasis on ob-
jective intent and arguing for its superiority over subjective intent). 
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As an analytical matter, unplanned coauthorship initially drew on the 
common law’s objective theory of contract formation for its ideas.14 
Courts relying on the concept thus continued to reiterate that they were 
merely ascertaining the parties’ real “intentions,” which they empha-
sized remained the ultimate basis of coauthorship in this manifestation 
as well.15 All the same, it becomes readily apparent that courts devel-
oping the idea of unplanned coauthorship were doing much more than 
just attempting to discern the parties’ states of mind. First, in adopting 
(and preferring16) an objective evaluation of intention, courts provided 
few reasons for why the absence of a formal agreement should not simp-
ly be treated as disqualifying on the issue (of coauthorship) in much the 
same way that copyright law treats the absence of certain other formali-
ties as disqualifying.17 Doing so would have provided the law with an 
easy-to-follow, bright-line rule that would have made individual author-
ship the default form of authorship for copyright law and would have re-
quired parties to enter into a formal contract when they chose to deviate 
from it.18 Second, a close analysis of courts’ use of “intent” as their cri-
terion of scrutiny reveals an extensive variation in their conceptions and 
uses of the term. Variants include a “collaborative intent,”19 
 
14 For an overview of the objective theory of contract law, see Larry A. DiMatteo, Con-
tract Theory: The Evolution of Contractual Intent 9–13 (1998); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
The Common Law 134–38 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1881); Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari 
and Perillo on Contracts § 2.2, at 26–28 (5th ed. 2003); Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the 
Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 427–
29 (2000). 
15 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that 
coauthorship under copyright law requires “objective manifestations of a shared intent” 
among parties); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1068–69, 1071–72 (7th Cir. 
1994) (emphasizing that collaboration without an intention was insufficient to find coauthor-
ship and then attempting to discern this intention objectively); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 
500, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1991) (discerning from objective evidence an intention among parties 
to be regarded as joint authors of the work in question). 
16 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234. 
17 Copyright’s rules on transfer of ownership are a good example here. These rules invali-
date any purported transfer unless it is “in writing and signed by the owner.” See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 204(a) (2012). Oral transfers are thus rendered inoperative.  
18 Indeed, we see courts accepting this logic to cabin the objective determination of intent 
without considering whether it ought to extend to the very process of objectively determin-
ing intent. See, e.g., Childress, 945 F.2d at 508 (“Examination of whether the putative co-
authors ever shared an intent to be co-authors serves the valuable purpose of appropriately 
confining the bounds of joint authorship arising by operation of copyright law, while leaving 
those not in a true joint authorship relationship with an author free to bargain for an ar-
rangement that will be recognized as a matter of both copyright and contract law.”). 
19 Eckert v. Hurley Chi. Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
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“shared . . . intent,”20 “intent to create a joint work,”21 “intent to work 
together,”22 and an “intent to share ownership.”23 Each conception leads 
a court to a different outcome and, while premised on the same overall 
idea, nonetheless entails a fundamentally different emphasis in the anal-
ysis. This variation once again suggests that courts are, for the most part, 
using intent (and the unplanned coauthorship inquiry) as a lens through 
which to undertake a deeper scrutiny of the cooperative process before 
characterizing the parties as coauthors. 
The search for “intent” as part of the unplanned coauthorship inquiry 
is thus unquestionably a proxy for various normative considerations, 
which courts have failed to articulate with any degree of coherence. In-
deed, when invited to adopt the idea of “intent” in its interpretation of 
the coauthorship requirement under U.K. law, the U.K. Court of Appeal 
openly refused to do so, observing that the intent requirement was a 
conduit for policy considerations, and that U.K. courts needed to avoid 
stepping “into the uncertain realms of policy.”24 Courts in the United 
States, however, find little reason to stay away from policy considera-
tions in copyright disputes, and perhaps for good reason.25 The element 
of intent in coauthorship is no exception. 
In this Article, I will argue that copyright’s rules on unplanned coau-
thorship serve an altogether different, and so far unappreciated, purpose. 
The idea of unplanned coauthorship and the rules governing its invoca-
tion derive from the recognition that some creative expression is only 
ever produced through cooperative behavior among individuals. In these 
instances, the cooperative enterprise is hardly redundant to the creative 
process (in the sense of merely representing an alternative mechanism of 
 
20 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234; Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp., 
303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
21 Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1327 (2d Cir. 1989) (Pierce, J., concurring); Papa’s-
June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
22 Janky, 576 F.3d at 362. 
23 Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
24 Hodgens v. Beckingham, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143, [53] (Eng.). For an endorsement of 
this argument, which seems to accept the idea of legislative supremacy in copyright lawmak-
ing as an immutable rule, see Lior Zemer, Is Intention to Co-Author an “Uncertain Realm of 
Policy?,” 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 611, 623–24 (2007). 
25 For a fuller discussion of the role of courts in U.S. copyright lawmaking, see 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Stewarding the Common Law of Copyright, 60 J. Copyright Soc’y 
U.S.A. 103, 108–16 (2013) (describing such judge-made law as the “federal common law of 
copyright” and providing examples of it). 
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production), but is instead integral to the very creation of the work by 
being directly constitutive of the parties’ reasons and motivations for 
producing it. Situations of unplanned coauthorship represent scenarios 
where one collaborator’s contributions are inextricably tied to those of 
another and this forms an integral part of each collaborator’s incentive to 
undertake the creative task to begin with. The rules of unplanned coau-
thorship thus give recognition to the existence of what is best described 
as the collaborative impulse: the motivation to engage in a creative en-
terprise because of its fundamentally cooperative nature. While this mo-
tivation may at times coexist with a creator’s other authorial motivations 
(for example, market-based ones), it is perfectly capable of providing 
creators with an independent reason to produce the work. It is this col-
laborative impulse that discussions of intention in the domain of un-
planned coauthorship all too readily mask. 
An example helps illustrate the working of the collaborative impulse. 
The practice of songwriting in the music industry is fairly well known as 
a cooperative enterprise, and usually involves a lyricist, who supplies the 
lyrics for the song, and a composer, who sets the lyrics to music.26 They 
often work together as a team and their contributions are usually inextri-
cably linked together to produce a musical work. While the two contri-
butions might in theory be capable of existing independently, it makes 
little sense to conceptualize them as such. When it is also indeed the 
case that the lyricist’s reasons for contributing to the song originate in 
the realization that the composer will be setting it to music and vice-
versa, providing both parties with an additional, yet independent, moti-
vation for engaging in their creative endeavor, the collective enterprise 
can be said to emanate—at least in part, even if not in whole—from a 
collaborative impulse. Thus, the lyricist and composer can be treated as 
coauthors of the song by copyright law. As should be obvious, it is the 
last element, the examination of the parties’ motivations, that is critical 
to unplanned coauthorship and lurks under the varied conceptions of “in-
tent.” 
All of copyright law is thought to emanate from the foundational idea 
that its promise of limited market exclusivity forms the principal motiva-
 
26 See Joe Bennett, Constraint, Collaboration, and Creativity in Popular Songwriting 
Teams, in The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process 139, 160 (Dave 
Collins ed., 2012) (describing this practice as widespread in the industry).  
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tion for creators to produce original expression.27 Recognizing the exist-
ence of a collaborative impulse that provides its own set of motivations 
for creativity in cooperative settings injects a degree of nuance and qual-
ification into copyright’s theory of incentives. Whereas copyright’s the-
ory of incentives assumes that utility maximization explains all creative 
behavior, the possibility that the mere reality of collaboration might pro-
vide creators with added reasons for their creative output suggests that 
forms of non-individualistic influences may indeed be at play in certain 
domains of creative activity. 
Scholars working in the field of philosophy of action have, over the 
last two decades, developed a series of important insights into under-
standing the nature of cooperative behavior.28 A central theme in this 
work has been the effort to understand the unique kind of intention that 
parties possess when they engage in such cooperation and the nature of 
motivations that accompany such intention. In addition to being reduc-
tive, these understandings also serve to disaggregate and illuminate the 
precise nature of the various commitments that cooperators (that is, col-
laborators) hold during their collective actions. Drawing on this body of 
work, I will unpack the working of the collaborative impulse and the 
commitments that it connotes, and in so doing will provide a framework 
through which to understand copyright’s rules on unplanned coauthor-
ship. Whereas copyright’s economic rationale posits that the incentive to 
create takes shape entirely from the market for the final creative work 
being produced, studies of cooperative intention suggest that in coopera-
tive creativity a significant part of the motivation takes shape from the 
creative process, and is thus means- rather than ends-based. While this 
means-orientation certainly does not undermine copyright’s overall 
structural focus on the market, it necessitates carving out a domain with-
in this overall focus for additional normative influences on both the 
creative process and the doctrines analyzing it. 
 
27 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).  
28 For pioneering work in this field, see Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected 
Essays on Intention and Agency 93–161 (1999); Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collec-
tive Intentionality (Hans Bernhard Schmid et al. eds., 2008); Margaret Gilbert, On Social 
Facts 408–44 (1989); John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 
180–96 (1983); John R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civiliza-
tion 44–58 (2010); John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995); Margaret Gil-
bert, Modelling Collective Belief, 73 Synthese 185, 202 (1987). 
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Unplanned coauthorship is thus best understood as an effort to inte-
grate copyright’s utilitarian commitment to exclusivity with the demands 
that collaboration introduces into creators’ motivations. And copyright’s 
primary way of achieving this balance is by examining the precise na-
ture and content of the parties’ actions and motivations. The rules of un-
planned coauthorship, which involve determining the interconnectedness 
of each party’s contributions and their mutual intent,29 in reality repre-
sent an effort to determine the existence and pervasiveness of the col-
laborative impulse underlying the creation of the work in question. The 
element of interconnectedness ensures that the parties, from an internal 
point of view, likely conceived of their project as intrinsically coopera-
tive, while the question of “intention” examines their motivations at a 
deeper level to validate the existence of a commitment to the process of 
jointly producing the work rather than just producing it. 
Copyright’s recognition of the collaborative impulse in its rules of 
unplanned coauthorship is more than just of relevance to our understand-
ing of coauthorship. It highlights an additional source of normative plu-
ralism within the working of copyright,30 in the process calling into 
question monistic, foundational accounts of copyright. In doing so, it 
paves the way forward for a less individualistic conception of creativity 
and cultural production within copyright law and policy. 
This Article will unfold in three parts. Part I will begin with an exam-
ination of copyright’s rules on unplanned coauthorship by tracing the or-
igins of these rules, the mechanisms employed by courts while creating 
and developing them incrementally, and the legal implications that flow 
from being designated as an unplanned coauthor. Part II will set out the 
idea of the collaborative impulse by drawing on ideas and insights from 
the philosophy of action. It will examine the ideas of shared agency, col-
lective intentionality, and shared cooperative activity, developed in the 
work of Professor Michael Bratman, and then unpack the nature of the 
collaborative impulse as an independent motivation in human behavior. 
Part III will attempt to reconceptualize the rules of unplanned coauthor-
 
29 The contours of these rules are, of course, found in Title 17 of the U.S. Code’s formal 
definition of a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention 
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
30 For previous suggestions that copyright embodies a commitment to normative pluralism, 
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 Duke L.J. 
203, 259–60 (2012); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: 
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1664, 1689 (2012). 
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ship through the collaborative impulse and examine the conceptual, 
normative, and doctrinal payoffs that flow from adopting this framework 
to understand the law. It will offer a new framework for understanding 
the idea of mutual intent during claims of unplanned coauthorship, and 
illustrate the framework’s application using one of copyright law’s best-
known cases on coauthorship. 
I. UNPLANNED COAUTHORSHIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The practice of coauthorship—or cooperative authorship—pre-dates 
copyright law by at least a century. Historians of the English Renais-
sance have noted how it was somewhat common practice among play-
wrights of the period to collaborate amongst themselves in the writing of 
new dramatic works.31 While some historians characterize coauthorship 
in this field and era as the “dominant mode” of production, others 
acknowledge its prevalence but insist that it was nonetheless outnum-
bered by solitary authorship.32 For our purposes though, it is sufficient to 
note that coauthorship had emerged as a formal mode of cultural produc-
tion by the early sixteenth century. Indeed, some recent historical work 
suggests that a good number of plays originally attributed solely to 
Shakespeare may have indeed been the products of a coauthorship be-
tween him and other contemporary playwrights of the period.33 
Despite this reality, when copyright law first emerged in the early 
eighteenth century in the Statute of Anne, individual or solitary author-
ship was taken to be the dominant mode of cultural production.34 De-
bates about copyright law revolved around the idealized image of the 
romantic author who was believed to produce original expression 
through a predominantly individualistic process.35 It was not until the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century that courts applying copyright law 
 
31 See, e.g., Gerald Eades Bentley, The Profession of Dramatist in Shakespeare’s Time: 
1590–1642, at 199 (1971); Jeffrey Masten, Textual Intercourse: Collaboration, Authorship, 
and Sexualities in Renaissance Drama 14 (1997); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Ef-
fect: Recovering Collectivity, in The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in 
Law and Literature 15, 15–28 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). 
32 Masten, supra note 31 (characterizing it as the “dominant mode”); Knapp, supra note 7, 
at 1 (questioning this characterization). 
33 See Vickers, supra note 5, at 137. 
34 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 2 (1993) (describing how 
copyright was founded on the idea of individual creativity); see Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Gr. Brit.). 
35 See Andrew Bennett, The Author 51–52 (2005); Woodmansee, supra note 31, at 23–24. 
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had to grapple with the institution of coauthorship and apply copyright’s 
nuances to it. And not surprisingly, the first case that a court was pre-
sented with involved a dispute between a playwright and his collabora-
tors.36 
In Levy v. Rutley, the plaintiff operated a theater company and hired a 
playwright to produce a play for performance at the theater.37 When the 
playwright finished producing the play, the plaintiff and his colleagues 
made some alterations to the play, including the introduction of an alto-
gether new scene.38 The modified version was produced commercially 
for the public. Upon the playwright’s death, the plaintiff claimed to be a 
coauthor of the work and sued the defendant, who produced the play 
without permission from the plaintiff or the original author. In the ab-
sence of an express agreement between the plaintiff and the playwright 
(about ownership), the court focused its attention on the absence of a 
“preconcerted joint design”39 to find against coauthorship. One judge 
thus observed: 
[I]f two persons undertake jointly to write a play, agreeing in the gen-
eral outline and design, and sharing the labour of working it out, each 
would be contributing to the whole production, and they might be said 
to be joint authors of it. But, to constitute joint authorship, there must 
be a common design.40 
“Common design” thus emerged as the benchmark for coauthorship in 
copyright law. When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909, how-
ever, coauthorship found no mention whatsoever in the statute and its 
various rules.41 Consequently, it fell entirely to courts to extend copy-
right’s basic rules to situations of coauthorship.42 In one early case, 
Judge Learned Hand, finding Levy to be the only case on the question of 
coauthorship, extended its logic to the question of coauthorship in the 
Act of 1909.43 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
 
36 Levy v. Rutley, (1871) 6 L.R.P.C. 523 at 523 (Eng.). 
37 Id. at 523–24. 
38 Id. at 524.  
39 Id. at 528 (Byles, J.). 
40 Id. at 529 (Keating, J.) (emphasis added). 
41 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
42 Carey, Study No. 12, supra note 10 (“The evolution of the concept of joint authorship, 
and the incidents of joint ownership have been entirely of a juridical nature.”). 
43 Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
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cuit reiterated the idea, emphasizing the “joint co-operation” between 
the parties as essential to the issue of coauthorship.44 In a notable deci-
sion some years later, Judge Hand, this time while on the Second Cir-
cuit, extended the idea of a “common design” even further, to situations 
where the parties did not work in concert and knew nothing of each oth-
er.45 As long as the parties “mean[t] their contributions to be comple-
mentary in the sense that they are to be embodied in a single work,” they 
were to be treated as coauthors under the common design framework.46 
Other cases further applied and developed the idea of the common de-
sign, such that this judicially developed set of rules came to be closely 
reviewed during the drafting of the Copyright Act of 1976.47 The 1976 
Act for the first time defined a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two 
or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged in-
to inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”48 The legisla-
tive history accompanying the Act makes clear that Congress intended to 
continue the common design framework, and intended that a “work is 
‘joint’ if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each prepared his 
or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be 
merged with the contributions of other authors.”49 On the face of things, 
Congress’s use of the disjunctive in its analysis seems to suggest that 
where the authors were unambiguously collaborating on the production 
of the work, the question of intent becomes somewhat irrelevant. A col-
laboration by its very nature clearly evinces a common design between 
the parties. Yet later cases construed the intention element as applicable 
to both prongs (that is, as applicable even to a collaboration50) in keep-
 
44 Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921). 
45 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 
1944).  
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films, 242 F.2d 266, 267–68 (2d Cir. 1957); Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955); Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 409–10 (2d Cir. 1946); Ted Browne 
Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754–55 (2d Cir. 1923); Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 
F. Supp. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Picture Music v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 645 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). For a review of the case law on the subject between 1909 and 1960, see 
Carey, Study No. 12, supra note 10, at 90–101. 
48 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “joint work”). 
49 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5734 (em-
phasis added). 
50 Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress v. Taylor, 
945 F.2d 500, 505–06 (2d Cir. 1991). For an affirmation of this position, see 2 William F. 
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ing with Congress’s additional observation that “[t]he touchstone here is 
the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed 
or combined into an integrated unit.”51 As a result, even when collabora-
tion was shown to exist as a factual matter, courts began searching for 
something else that they might characterize as the parties’ intent, in or-
der to satisfy the definition.52 Common design thus became encapsulated 
within a framework of active consent, or intention. While this certainly 
did not mean that the subjective intent of the parties became the princi-
pal standard, it nonetheless meant that courts had to describe their analy-
sis in terms of a search for the parties’ real intentions. 
A. Finding Coauthorship Ex Post 
In attempting to give effect to the notion of a common design behind 
the cooperative exercise, the Act of 1976 made the concept of “inten-
tion” the touchstone for a work of joint authorship. Indeed, the legisla-
tive history leading up to the passage of the Act reveals that the drafters 
were initially reluctant to use intention as an idea for the concept of co-
authorship, worrying that the search for an elusive state of mind among 
the parties would distract courts from the real essence of coauthorship 
(namely, the collaboration).53 Some have argued that in its very genesis, 
the idea of intention was thus meant to exclude subjective intent and fo-
cus entirely on the objective activities of the parties producing the 
work.54 
Despite the codification, courts continued to develop the rules of co-
authorship on an incremental basis.55 In most instances of coauthorship 
the parties agree with each other in advance, both as to the nature of the 
collaboration and on their respective ownership claims to the final work, 
 
Patry, Patry on Copyright § 5:4 (2014) (suggesting that courts use “or” as illustrative, fol-
lowing the interpretation laid down in Childress). 
51 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 49. 
52 See, e.g., Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068–69 (rejecting the “collaboration alone” standard for 
determining the existence of coauthorship and requiring additional evidence of “intention”).  
53 For a review of this history, see Brady, supra note 13, at 266–67 nn.73–74. 
54 Id. 
55 For some prominent cases developing the law further, see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 
F.3d 644, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2004); Brod v. General Publishing Group, 32 F. App’x 231, 234 
(9th Cir. 2002); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson v. 
Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 196 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068; Childress, 945 F.2d at 
505; Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 
1991); M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1489–90 (11th Cir. 1990). 
BALGANESH_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2014 6:08 PM 
1696 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 100:1683 
necessitating little judicial interpretation (and validation) of the ar-
rangement. The principal instances that actually reach courts and require 
their intervention are instead those where there exists no formal agree-
ment between the parties, which in turn necessitate courts’ interpreta-
tions of the parties’ actions and behaviors to determine the existence of a 
common design or the intention to produce a work of joint authorship. 
The courts’ task in such situations is usually further compounded by the 
parties’ fundamental disagreement about their real intentions while un-
dertaking the collaboration. In these instances, the status of coauthorship 
is determined ex post and imputed to parties, much like how the objec-
tive theory of contract formation interprets the parties’ actions to find 
the existence of a contract ex post.56 
This ex post nature of the determination introduces an important nu-
ance into the process of determining whether the parties ought to be 
classified as coauthors. The absence of an advance ownership arrange-
ment between the parties invariably forces courts to rely extensively on 
objective evidence of cooperative behavior, often to the exclusion of ev-
idence relating to subjective intention on the question of coauthorship 
from the time of the work’s creation. In other words, the parties’ failure 
to convert their subjective intentions into an ownership agreement (of 
the final work) is treated as functionally preclusive of the question of 
subjective intent at the time of creation and as enabling courts to under-
take an in-depth scrutiny of the actual cooperative process to then de-
termine whether the parties ought to be treated as coauthors. 
The court’s approach in Strauss v. Hearst Corp. is a particularly good 
example of this strong preference for objective evidence.57 In that case, 
the defendant magazine had used the services of the plaintiff, a profes-
sional photographer, for a photo shoot relating to one its articles.58 Dur-
ing the shoot, the defendant’s representative played an active role in po-
sitioning the props and selecting the photograph to use, and its editors 
later retouched the photograph before final publication.59 The parties 
never entered into a formal contractual arrangement specifying their re-
lationship and ownership over the photographs. At trial, the court con-
cluded that the parties were indeed coauthors of the photographs. The 
court’s decision was based entirely on its analysis of the collaboration 
 
56 See generally sources cited supra note 14. 
57 No. 85 Civ. 10017 (CSH), 1988 WL 18932, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988). 
58 Id. at *1. 
59 Id. 
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involved in producing the photograph.60 Rather interestingly, the court 
disallowed any reliance on evidence relating to the parties’ subjective 
state of mind at the time the photographs were taken and before.61 The 
plaintiff sought to argue that he never intended to create a work of joint 
authorship and would not have consented to it had the matter been dis-
cussed.62 The court found this to be entirely irrelevant to its determina-
tion of coauthorship, which it based on objective evidence.63 Indeed, in a 
later case, the Ninth Circuit made this preference explicit, noting that 
any reliance on subjective intent “could become an instrument of fraud” 
by allowing one party to conceal its intent from the other and later on 
take full credit for the work.64 
In keeping with this idea, over time courts developed a set of indicia 
for this objective manifestation of intention in determining coauthor-
ship.65 While they continued to reiterate that subjective intent was not 
altogether irrelevant to the analysis,66 hardly any decision on the issue 
has placed emphasis on parties’ subjective states of mind in the determi-
nation of coauthorship. The net effect is that parties can be classified as 
coauthors of a work even in situations where they subjectively intended 
not to be coauthors if during the cooperative process of producing the 
work their behavior manifests the characteristics of such coauthorship. It 
is in this sense then that copyright law allows courts to validate what is 
best described as “unplanned coauthorship.” The consequence of this al-
lowance is that parties wishing to avoid the possibility of a coauthorship 
claim are now obligated to opt out by entering into an express agreement 
treating the work as a “work for hire.”67 Alternatively, the parties could 
 
60 Id. at *5–6. 
61 Id. at *6 n.5. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (“Such self-serving proclamations are unavailing.”). 
64 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Easter Seal Soc’y 
for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 
1987) (finding coauthorship based on objective evidence despite parties’ denials of any in-
tent to that effect). 
65 See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201–02 (2d Cir. 1998) (distilling such indicia 
from previous case law); 2 Patry, supra note 50, §§ 5:21–:27. 
66 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:28 (discussing cases that relied on subjective intent). 
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “work made for hire” as “a work specially or-
dered or commissioned . . . if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by 
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire”). Once such an agreement is 
entered into, the commissioning/ordering party comes to be treated by copyright law as both 
the author of the work and as its sole owner. Id. § 201(b). 
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simply execute a written transfer of ownership amongst themselves, al-
tering the principal consequence of coauthorship, proportional co-
ownership.68 
While intention forms the purported touchstone of the courts’ scrutiny 
of the cooperative process, a threshold issue that courts often confront 
before examining the parties’ intent relates to the nature of each party’s 
contribution to the final work. The question that emerged was thus 
whether each party needed to contribute copyrightable expression to the 
work, or whether it was sufficient if one contributed something even if 
that something was uncopyrightable as such (for instance, ideas or 
facts).69 The issue divided treatise writers early on.70 In due course, 
though, most courts around the country adopted the position that each 
coauthor had to make a copyrightable contribution to the work to be en-
titled to the status of coauthorship.71 This logic was drawn from the idea 
that coauthorship was in the end a form of authorship, which in turn ne-
cessitated the creation of a work of original expression.72 Some courts 
unfortunately went further than this and insisted that each coauthor’s 
contribution in addition be “independently copyrightable,” a position 
that appears to be fraught with obvious functional difficulties since the 
very definition of a joint work requires that the contributions be insepa-
rable or interdependent as such.73 Before scrutinizing the cooperative 
process, courts today begin by satisfying themselves that, to qualify as a 
coauthor, each party has contributed actual expression to the final work. 
 
68 The copyright statute requires such an agreement to be in writing. Id. § 204(a).  
69 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991) (adverting to the issue). 
70 See 1 Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice § 4.2.1.2, at 379 (1989) 
(taking the position that each author’s contribution needed to be copyrightable); William F. 
Patry, Latman’s The Copyright Law 116 (6th ed. 1986) (same). But cf. 1 Melville B. Nim-
mer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07, at 6-21 to 6-22 (2014) (taking the con-
trary position). 
71 For a survey of this acceptance, see 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:14 (“Every court to de-
cide the issue has correctly held that, in order to be a joint author, one must contribute ex-
pression.”). 
72 See id. (making this argument). But see Childress, 945 F.2d at 506 (refuting this logic 
by noting the concept of author could be used in the ordinary sense of the term). 
73 See, e.g., Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th 
Cir. 2009); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity Thea-
tre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994). For a criticism of this approach, see Gaiman v. 
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004); 2 Patry, supra note 50, §§ 5:15–:16. The 
Nimmer treatise argues that Gaiman vindicates the treatise’s original position. See 1 Nim-
mer, supra note 70, § 6.07. 
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Unplanned coauthorship is thus in essence a process wherein courts 
determine the parties’ statuses as coauthors ex post, based on their scru-
tiny of the cooperative process for objective evidence of such coauthor-
ship. The real puzzle that continues to plague unplanned coauthorship, 
however, lies in understanding what precisely it is that courts are look-
ing for when they claim to be ascertaining the collaborating parties’ in-
tentions, an issue to which the next Section turns. 
B. The Mystery of Mutual Intent 
“The touchstone [of coauthorship] is the intention, at the time the 
writing is done.”74 This observation, taken from the legislative history 
accompanying the Copyright Act’s definition of a work of joint author-
ship, has since assumed immense significance in the understanding of 
unplanned coauthorship. And without question, it has also been respon-
sible for the rather significant muddying of the law. In keeping with this 
observation (and the definition’s emphasis on “knowledge and inten-
tion”75), courts attempting to construe the 1976 Act’s rules on unplanned 
coauthorship soon came to reiterate that in addition to an expressive 
contribution that would qualify each contributor as an author, there 
needed to also be an intention among the contributors that their work 
would merge together and result in the creation of a joint work.76 
Simple as it may have seemed in theory, when translated into practice 
the idea proved to be grossly underspecified. While intention certainly 
entailed a scrutiny of the parties’ state of mind—either subjective or ob-
jective—the legislative history was silent on the question of what the in-
tention needed to be directed at to meet the definition’s requirement. 
Was it sufficient if the parties evinced an intention to collaborate in the 
production of the work? Or did they need to additionally carry an inten-
tion to become coauthors as a legal matter, by producing a work of joint 
authorship and recognizing its consequences? Not surprisingly, courts 
have struggled to answer these questions—despite their continuing em-
phasis on the idea of intention. 
 
74 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5734 (em-
phasis added). 
75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”). 
76 See, e.g., Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201–02; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1066; Childress, 945 F.2d 
at 507–08. 
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The Second Circuit’s decision in Childress v. Taylor is credited with 
articulating the importance of intention to the question of coauthorship.77 
The court there emphasized that examining “how the putative joint au-
thors regarded themselves in relation to the work” was critical, an obser-
vation that later courts echoed.78 Yet, as Judge Calabresi would point out 
a few years after, Childress and the cases reciting its observations pro-
vide very little guidance on the “nature of the necessary intent.”79 
Speaking in the abstract, the parties’ intentions during the production 
of a joint work can be understood as relating to (1) the process of pro-
ducing the work (that is, the cooperative activity—the means); (2) the 
production of the joint work (the end); or (3) the legal consequences of 
the merger. Yet in one form or the other, courts across the country have 
eliminated all three options as viable candidates in understanding the na-
ture of the intention required for unplanned coauthorship. 
A singular focus on “collaboration” was ruled out as insufficient fair-
ly early on. In one notable decision, the Seventh Circuit categorically re-
jected what it described as the “collaboration alone” standard, which it 
associated with the idea of a simple “contemporaneous input” by both 
parties.80 The court’s logic was that the statute (and the Constitution) 
mandated more than this, and required establishing an intention to merge 
the contributions into a unitary whole.81 Yet in subsequent cases where 
the parties had in fact merged their contributions into a final work, and 
obviously did so intentionally, courts again went on to find that the in-
tention was insufficient to satisfy the Act’s requirement.82 This time, 
their logic appears to relate to the question of intention only indirectly. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Thomson v. Larson is illustrative.83 
In Thomson, a noted playwright had sought the assistance of a drama-
turg in the production of a show. For months thereafter they “worked ex-
tremely intensively together” on the script.84 The playwright made all 
 
77 Childress, 945 F.2d at 508; see also Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1067 (describing the addition 
of intent as a variable in the coauthorship determination as “the Childress standard”). 
78 Childress, 945 F.2d at 508. 
79 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201. 
80 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1067, 1069. 
81 Id. at 1068–69. 
82 Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“It is not 
enough that [the parties] intend to merge their contributions into one unitary work.” (citing 
Childress, 945 F.2d at 507)). 
83 147 F.3d 195. 
84 Id. at 197. 
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the changes and failed to credit the dramaturg as an author.85 The court 
eventually concluded that the parties lacked the requisite intent to pro-
duce a joint work, citing the playwright’s unilateral decision-making au-
thority as a principal factor.86 It remains unclear why unilateral decision 
making is facially incompatible with the idea of an intention to merge 
contributions into a single final work. The two parties collaborated in-
tensively with the clear objective of producing a single final work, and 
each certainly contributed expression to that final work, while all the 
time recognizing that one contributor was to decide what to keep in and 
what to keep out (owing to that contributor’s superior expertise). How is 
this not evidence of an intention among the parties to collaborate in the 
production of a unified work? The idea seems to have taken root in an 
effort to avoid coauthorship claims by a party that merely suggests 
changes as an outsider to a work, and to prevent the primary creator 
from being deterred from sharing the work for fear of such claims later 
on.87 Yet this seems to have little to do with the absence of an intention 
to collaborate in the production of the work in cases where the decision-
making author himself/herself evinces an intention to use the contribu-
tion in the final work. The net effect is that courts have implicitly ruled 
out a cooperative intent to produce a unified work as the primary candi-
date for intention. 
This leaves us with the third candidate (namely, that the parties must 
evince an intention to bear the legal consequences of coauthorship). 
Once again, some courts have eschewed this standard as well, and this 
time by explicitly observing that intention “does not require an under-
standing by the co-authors of the legal consequences of their relation-
ship.”88 Nonetheless, they routinely add that “some distinguishing char-
acteristic” of the relationship needs to be present, and use this latter 
observation to find the presence or absence of what is essentially an 
awareness of those very legal consequences.89 Courts thus routinely look 
to how the parties have billed or credited their roles, and use it to find 
the absence of an “intent to share ownership.”90 Ownership and the con-
 
85 Id. at 197–98. 
86 Id. at 202–04. 
87 See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Progress would be 
retarded rather than promoted, if an author could not consult with others and adopt their use-
ful suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership of the work.”). 
88 Childress, 945 F.2d at 508. 
89 Id.; see also Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201–02. 
90 Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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nected right to be attributed as owner/author are both legal consequences 
of coauthorship rather than primary facts that go into the construction of 
coauthorship, rendering the courts’ logic in relying on it somewhat sus-
pect. 
It is therefore surprising that despite their insistence that mutual inten-
tion remain the “touchstone” of unplanned coauthorship, and their con-
tinuing emphasis on discerning parties’ intentions whenever presented 
with claims of unplanned coauthorship, courts have found little common 
ground in unraveling the precise nature and analytical content of this in-
tention. As operationalized today, the question of intention is relegated 
to the rote examination of a checklist of “objective indicia”91 by courts, 
with little scrutiny of how those factors—either contextually or in the 
abstract—relate to what the element of intention is trying to achieve. In 
the end then, claims of unplanned coauthorship, centered as they are on 
mutual intent, appear to be decided on a largely subjective basis despite 
courts’ recitation of non-dispositive variables during the analysis. 
This is hardly to suggest that the question of intention is altogether ir-
relevant. The key to understanding its role and working lies instead in 
appreciating how the institution of coauthorship connects to copyright’s 
overall goal of inducing creativity. Indeed, even Childress alluded to 
this, when Judge Newman observed that coauthorship was doing more 
than just focusing “solely on the objective of copyright law to encourage 
the production of creative works.”92 Yet, it remains true that Childress’s 
promise has hardly been realized in practice given how courts today ap-
proach the question of intention in coauthorship.93 Parts II and III turn to 
reconstructing unplanned coauthorship through the vehicle of objective 
intent. 
C. Implications: Entitlement and Immunity 
Before proceeding to understand how unplanned coauthorship and its 
emphasis on intent can be meaningfully understood within copyright’s 
overall structural commitment to inducing creativity, it is worth pausing 
to note that the consequences of classifying a contributor to a work as a 
 
91 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201–02 & n.17. 
92 Childress, 945 F.2d at 506. 
93 For a similar criticism, see Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright 
and Collective Creativity, in The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law 
and Literature 29, 54–55 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). 
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coauthor are fairly far-reaching. Once classified as a legal coauthor by 
copyright law, a contributor becomes a co-owner of the work in ques-
tion.94 Perhaps more importantly though, copyright law pays no attention 
to the relative contributions of the parties, and as a result recognizes 
each coauthor to have an equal ownership stake in the work in ques-
tion.95 Thus, a coauthor who makes minimal contributions to the final 
work is nonetheless accorded equal share with the other author who 
makes a more significant contribution.96 While the parties may alter this 
contractually in advance,97 in most instances of unplanned coauthorship 
where coauthorship is determined as an objective matter by courts, the 
parties are treated as having an equal ownership share in the work. 
Since the coauthor is an owner of copyright in the work, several addi-
tional legal consequences accrue to the coauthor. First, as a co-owner of 
the work, a coauthor’s use of the work can never be an act of infringe-
ment.98 Since by definition the owner of a work cannot infringe his/her 
own work, coauthorship operates as a complete bar to infringement. It is 
for this reason that some courts have described coauthorship as an “af-
firmative defense” to copyright infringement, analogous to fair use.99 
This characterization is misleading, since it characterizes coauthorship 
as more of an immunity than an entitlement. It underplays (and perhaps 
ignores) the second legal consequence of co-ownership, which is that the 
coauthor is now entitled to use/exploit the entirety of the work in ques-
tion, without needing prior permission from the other coauthor.100 Each 
 
94 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in 
the work.”). 
95 Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994); Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 1 Nimmer, supra note 70, 
§ 6.08. For a criticism of this approach, suggesting that copyright law adopt a “principle of 
proportionality” where the ownership interest is in proportion to each author’s contribution, 
see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, in The Commodifi-
cation of Information 397, 412 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002). 
96 Childress, 945 F.2d at 508; 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:7 (“Thus, two joint authors each 
own a 50% interest in the whole, even if one author contributed only 10% of the work.”). 
97 1 Nimmer, supra note 70, § 6.08; 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:7. 
98 Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2011); Warren Freedenfeld Assocs. v. 
McTigue, 531 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 2008); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d 
Cir. 1989); 1 Nimmer, supra note 70, § 6.10[A][1][a] (“One joint owner cannot be liable for 
copyright infringement to another joint owner, given the baseline proposition that one cannot 
infringe his own copyright.”). 
99 See, e.g., SHL Imaging v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:43.50. 
100 1 Nimmer, supra note 70, § 6.10[A]. 
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coauthor can thus license the work to others, commence actions for in-
fringement against third parties, or independently use/transform/adapt 
the work in any way or form. The only duty imposed on a coauthor is 
that he/she must subsequently account, to the other coauthors, for any 
profits earned from the use of the joint work, and share such profits on a 
proportionate basis.101 Such a claim for accounting is however a matter 
of state common law rather than copyright law.102 Except for this duty—
which comes into play only after the use or exploitation—the coauthor is 
at complete liberty to use or exploit the work. This explains why un-
planned coauthorship remains an economically lucrative claim, and ac-
counts for why courts refrain from finding such coauthorship to exist in 
a vast majority of cases. 
II. THE COLLABORATIVE IMPULSE 
In insisting—at times dogmatically—that “mutual intent” form the 
touchstone of unplanned coauthorship, courts may have indeed been on-
to something, though perhaps unwittingly. For quite some time now, 
philosophers of action have argued and shown that what distinguishes 
cooperative endeavors such as coauthorship from other joint undertak-
ings is a phenomenon that has come to be described as “collective” or 
“shared” intentionality.103 Drawing on work in the field of action theory 
(that is, the philosophy of action), this Part argues that collective inten-
tionality does, under certain circumstances, generate a collaborative im-
pulse in actors that can be understood as motivational to the cooperative 
endeavor being undertaken. 
Unpacking and recognizing the salient characteristics of such collec-
tive intentionality—when motivational in authors’ participation in the 
collective endeavor—thus helps identify the presence and influence of 
the collaborative impulse on the production of the creative work. It is 
precisely this process at which courts’ elusive quest for mutual intent in 
cases of unplanned coauthorship can be seen as directed. This in turn has 
 
101 Id. § 6.12. 
102 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 652 (7th Cir. 2004); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 
121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5109, 5736; 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:9. 
103 For general but fairly exhaustive overviews of this literature, see Abraham Sesshu 
Roth, Shared Agency, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1–6 (Edward N. Zalta et al. 
eds., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency/; Deborah 
Tollefson, Collective Intentionality, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/coll-int/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2014). 
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important implications for our understanding of copyright law, which 
has long been premised on a particularly simplistic conception of crea-
tors’ motivations.104 In short then, this Part will make three inter-
connected claims: (1) that cooperative activities such as coauthorship are 
characterized by a distinctive collective intentionality; (2) that such in-
tentionality is produced by a core commitment to cooperation among ac-
tors; and (3) that this commitment is motivational in actors’ participation 
in the cooperative activity. The collaborative impulse, I will argue here, 
is but a manifestation of this commitment to cooperate, and acts as an 
independent reason for action among participants in a cooperative en-
deavor. 
A. Collective Intentionality and Cooperation 
Modern discussions of collective intentionality can usually be traced 
back to a 1990 essay by Professor John Searle on the topic that has since 
become a classic in the field.105 In it, Searle sets out to establish that 
there is indeed a distinctive cognitive phenomenon known as “collective 
intention,” and that it cannot be reduced to the individualized intentions 
of the participants. Or, as Searle puts it, “Collective intentional behavior 
is a primitive phenomenon that cannot be analyzed as just the summa-
tion of individual intentional behavior.”106 
Searle illustrates the working of collective intentionality through an 
example. Imagine several people sitting in a park on the grass in various 
places, and all of a sudden it begins to rain. Each individual begins to 
run toward the nearest shelter, and while each individual has an intention 
to so run, that intention is independent of the intentions of the others.107 
This is in contrast to a situation where a dance troupe in that same park 
 
104 See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By estab-
lishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
105 John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in Intentions in Communication 401, 
401–02 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990). In all fairness, the debate about collective inten-
tionality originated a few years prior to Searle’s entry into the field, with the work of Profes-
sors Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller. See Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller, We-
intentions, 53 Phil. Stud. 367, 367–72 (1988). Searle’s essay was in large part a refutation of 
Tuomela and Miller, though Searle’s own prior work on intentionality is considered seminal 
in the field. See, e.g., John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, at 
vii–x (1983). 
106 Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, supra note 105, at 401. 
107 Id. at 402–03.  
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converges on a particular point as part of a choreographed perfor-
mance.108 While from an outward perspective the individuals in both in-
stances may appear to be behaving in the same way (that is, running to-
ward a shelter or the convergence point), they remain fundamentally 
different.109 In the first case (unlike in the second), each individual’s in-
tention can be understood and expressed quite independently of similar 
intentions held by others in the vicinity. Searle thus argues that any indi-
vidual intention in the second case is in a sense “derivative” from a col-
lective intention held by the individuals, but is hardly the same when 
understood from an internal perspective.110 
Searle’s paper argues that what makes such collective intentions (or 
“we-intentions”) distinctive is that they must make reference in their un-
derlying structures to a collective process.111 Searle takes this one step 
further and argues that such collective intentionality is a “primitive” 
phenomenon in the sense of having biological roots and emanating from 
the capacity to see others as potential agents for cooperative behavior.112 
In a series of influential papers that represent the leading exposition 
of the idea in the field, Michael Bratman has sought to provide a distinct 
analytical framework to understand shared/collective intentions.113 Un-
like Searle’s account however, Bratman’s is reductive, in the sense of 
showing that collective (or to use Bratman’s term, “shared”) intention 
can be usefully reduced to individual intentions. Bratman’s accounts of 
shared intentions and shared cooperative activity are particularly illumi-
nating in understanding coauthorship and parties’ motivations and com-
mitments therein. 
According to Bratman, the existence of a “shared intention” requires 
three interrelated elements. First, each participant must intend to do the 
joint activity in question.114 Second, each party’s intent to so do the joint 
activity must originate in (that is, be “because of”) the other’s similar in-
 
108 Id. at 403. 
109 Id. (“Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly dif-
ferent internally.”). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 403–05. 
112 Id. at 402. 
113 See Michael Bratman, Intention and Means-End Reasoning, 90 Phil. Rev. 252, 254–56 
(1981); Michael Bratman, Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention, 144 Phil. 
Stud. 149, 150–51 (2009); Michael Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 Phil. Rev. 
327, 327–28 (1992); Michael Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 Ethics 97, 112–13 (1993); Mi-
chael Bratman, Two Faces of Intention, 93 Phil. Rev. 375, 375–76 (1984).  
114 Bratman, Shared Intention, supra note 113, at 103. 
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tent to do the joint activity and the fact that they have what Bratman de-
scribes as “meshing subplans.”115 A “subplan” refers to a further specifi-
cation of the broader objective contained in the joint activity. Thus, 
“painting a house” would be a joint activity, and “painting it red” would 
be a subplan under that activity.116 Bratman’s second condition is that 
while both parties need not have identical subplans, they nonetheless 
cannot “intend that the other’s relevant subplans be subverted,” which is 
the idea that they merely “mesh.”117 This intermeshing of subplans is 
hardly incidental, and is directly constitutive of each party’s intention to 
perform the joint activity.118 Each agent’s intention to perform the joint 
activity derives from—and informs—the other’s intention and subplans 
underlying that intention that the joint act be so performed. There is thus 
an indelible reflexivity built into each participant’s intention. Third, 
Bratman argues that a shared intention requires that each party’s inten-
tion (to do the joint activity) and his/her reasons for it be “common 
knowledge” among all the parties, which is the only way by which it be-
comes reciprocally motivating to each party’s reasons for action.119 
In so setting up the idea of shared intention, Bratman insists that it 
remains “primarily a psychological—rather than primarily a norma-
tive—phenomenon”120 in the sense that it does not, on its own, give rise 
to obligations even of an interpersonal kind among participants. While 
such an intention can give rise to obligations contextually, a shared in-
tention does not always generate obligations on its own.121 It is im-
portant to understand the sense in which Bratman’s view eschews imbu-
ing shared intentionality with a normative dimension. He certainly is not 
suggesting that shared intentionality cannot be motivational, or that it is 
incapable of generating normative obligations; he asserts just that it is 
not constitutively necessary for his reductive understanding of what 
shared intentionality needs to entail, at a minimum, for its existence.122 
This narrow understanding of normativity is important to appreciate as 
we move to using the idea of shared intentionality to understand coau-
thorship. Bratman is thus hardly suggesting that the intentions underly-
 
115 Id. at 106. 
116 Id. at 105. 
117 Id. at 105–06. 
118 Id. at 104. 
119 Id. at 103–04. 
120 Id. at 112. 
121 Id. at 110–11. 
122 Id. (“[S]hared intentions are frequently accompanied by such obligations.”). 
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ing the phenomenon of shared intentionality cannot provide independent 
reasons for parties’ behavior, in the sense of being motivational in the 
formation of their own reasons for actions. To the contrary, their motiva-
tional nature is central to his theory. 
Somewhat more importantly for us though, Bratman builds his theory 
of shared intentions, which he describes as a certain “attitude” of mind, 
into a full-blown account of behavior and activity motivated by such in-
tentions. And it is in this account that we see how shared intentions are 
capable of being motivational in actors’ behavior. Using the idea of 
shared intentions, Bratman identifies an analytically distinct kind of ac-
tivity that he describes as “shared cooperative activity.”123 Three distinct 
features are taken to be characteristic of such activity. First, the parties 
performing the activity are “mutually responsive” to each other’s inten-
tions and actions.124 Second, the parties evince a “commitment” to the 
joint action in question.125 Third, the parties manifest a commitment to 
mutually supporting each other during the performance of the activity so 
as to ensure the successful performance of the joint activity.126 
It is in the second and third of the above conditions that Bratman then 
draws the useful distinction between a “joint” activity and a “shared co-
operative” activity. Without either of them, mutually responsive action 
could include the behavior of two soldiers on a battlefield who are re-
sponding to each other’s moves.127 It would be odd to characterize their 
activity as joint, shared, or cooperative in any sense of the term. Adding 
the second feature to the first introduces the idea that each participant 
has “an intention in favor of the joint activity.”128 And for this to make 
logical sense (and avoid a circularity in definition), the activity in ques-
tion will need to be understood in a cooperatively neutral way that 
doesn’t presuppose the very element of cooperation.129 Thus, the activity 
of “playing chess together” is cooperatively loaded since it is incapable 
of being understood in individualized intentional terms, unlike the act of 
“painting a house,” which can be understood in both individualized and 
shared terms. The commitment to performing the activity jointly thus 
 
123 See Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 113, at 327–28. 
124 Id. at 328. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 328–29. 
128 Id. at 329 (emphasis omitted). 
129 Id. at 330. 
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renders the activity a “joint activity” in Bratman’s understanding. This 
commitment is characterized by the actors’ intentions to perform the ac-
tivity that is built on the “meshing subplans” of the parties that are in 
and of themselves reciprocal. The content of these subplans may be de-
veloped during the actual performance, but each actor intends to have 
them mesh and this in turn forms a large part of the intention behind the 
very performance of the joint activity.130 But for the joint intention to 
transcend its status as a mere attitude and become embodied in an activi-
ty, this reciprocal reinforcement of subplans needs to occur not just at 
the level of intention, but also at the level of action. Participants in a 
jointly intentional activity therefore have to be mutually responsive to 
each other’s subplans during the performance of the activity.131 
This still does not introduce the element of cooperation needed to 
make it a cooperative activity. Such activity in addition requires a com-
mitment to supporting the other participant during the performance of 
the joint activity. It is thus the introduction of the third feature—the 
commitment of mutual support—that converts a merely joint activity in-
to a shared cooperative.132 
The commitment to mutually supporting each other during the per-
formance of the activity introduces a relatively high bar into the analysis 
of the activity. Bratman illustrates the idea using the example of two 
singers who set out to sing a duet jointly. He describes how each of them 
has a set of beliefs and commitments that satisfies each of the three re-
quirements necessary for simple shared intentionality.133 They may thus 
be committed to the joint activity (namely, singing the duet together). 
Yet, he notes, they might in addition intend to be unhelpful to each oth-
er—in the sense that if one fails during the performance of the duet, the 
other does nothing to cover, and lets the other publicly fail—as long as 
the joint end—singing the duet—is realized.134 This, he argues, is anti-
 
130 Id. at 332–34. 
131 Id. at 339. It is important to note here that Bratman describes this within the context of 
shared cooperative activities, but seems willing to extend it to joint activities as well, with 
the primary difference being the second commitment (to mutual support). Id. at 337. Other 
scholars interpreting Bratman have adopted a similar analysis. See Daniel Markovits, Con-
tract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1452–54 (2004) (describing jointly intentional 
activities as containing an element of coordination, even if not cooperation, as Bratman sug-
gests). 
132 Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 113, at 336–37. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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thetical to the idea of shared cooperative activity, even though it remains 
a joint activity since both parties have a shared intention and are com-
mitted to the joint activity as such.135 The joint activity would become a 
shared cooperative activity only if the singers in addition also manifest-
ed a second commitment: a commitment to supporting the other during 
the activity (of singing) so as to ensure that the activity itself is indeed 
successfully performed.136 The act need not be successfully performed as 
such; it merely requires that the parties have an intent to support each 
other to bring about the success. The precise form and nature of this 
support will of course vary contextually. Yet the minimal idea is that 
there must be some “cooperatively relevant circumstances” where one 
participant is willing to help the other in the pursuit of the activity, with-
out some new/independent incentive emerging for such support.137 In 
other words, the commitment must be to the cooperative nature of the 
endeavor and must transcend a participant’s belief that her doing only 
her part will suffice. Only when joint activity is thus “minimally cooper-
atively stable” in embodying cooperatively relevant circumstances 
where one actor would support the other does it become shared coopera-
tive activity.138 
It is important to note here that Bratman characterizes both the second 
and third features of shared cooperative activity in terms of “commit-
ments.” Or put another way, a jointly intended activity contains a com-
mitment to the joint activity, and a cooperative activity embodies com-
mitments to both the joint activity and to mutually supporting the other 
participant in it. Unpacking Bratman’s idea of commitment is thus cen-
tral to understanding the working of shared intentions and their broader 
role in motivating human agency during joint and cooperative activities. 
Intentions—to Bratman—involve commitments to future action.139 Be-
cause they play a fundamentally motivational role, by combining with 
the agent’s prior beliefs to move the agent to act, they embody what he 
calls “pro-attitudes.”140 Such intentions thus work to control the agent’s 
future actions by providing the agent with a reason to perform that ac-
tion in the future, based on the volitional commitment that the agent un-
 
135 Id. at 337. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 337–38. 
138 Id. 
139 Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason 15 (1987). 
140 Id. 
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dertook when generating it. In addition, the existence of such a future-
directed intention and the volitional commitment underlying it have a 
characteristic stability that causes the agent to resist reconsideration until 
the completion of the action associated with the intention.141 Now this 
certainly does not imply the irrevocability of the intention; it just means 
that absent new reasons, the intention and the commitment work as de-
fault reasons of their own to move the agent. 
To speak of a commitment to the joint activity is thus to admit that the 
agents involved in it are motivated to partake in the joint activity, be-
cause of each other’s participation and mutual similar intention, and as a 
result come to develop the intermeshing subplans needed to perform the 
activity because of this conduct controlling commitment. The additional 
commitment to mutual support seen in a cooperative activity is thus a 
recognition that the parties are additionally moved to support each other 
during the performance of the activity in the exact same way that they 
committed to undertake the activity jointly to begin with (that is, the en-
deavor provides its own independent reasons for action). In so identify-
ing commitments as central to intentions, and as generating reasons for 
action that move an agent to behave in a certain way,142 Bratman’s ac-
count of jointly intentional and cooperative activities is thus in one im-
portant sense normative. 
Indeed, this motivational dimension of the shared intention in such 
joint activities is highlighted by what Bratman describes as their end-
providing dimension. In describing the intermeshing subplans and the 
interdependent nature of the intention, he observes that it is crucial for 
the intentions to be “interlocking,” such that each actor has an intention 
in favor of the efficacy of the intention of the other.143 Thus, he ob-
serves, “each agent must treat the relevant intentions of the other as end-
providing for herself.”144 
In summary, collective intentionality denotes a certain attitudinal 
commitment to joint actions, with joint activity and shared cooperative 
activity representing categories of activity that harness different features 
of such intentionality. They both operate through future-oriented voli-
tional commitments that the agent undertakes, which remain stable until 
the completion of the action and provide the agent with a set of reasons 
 
141 Id. at 16–17. 
142 Id. at 15. 
143 See Bratman, supra note 28, at 102. 
144 Id. 
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for a course of action. It remains then to be seen what the precise nature 
of this commitment is, and indeed in what sense it might be usefully 
characterized as motivational in our understanding of coauthorship, 
questions to which the next Section turns. 
B. Commitments as Reasons for Action 
Both joint activities and shared cooperative activities originate in the 
idea of collective or shared intention. Yet, in addition, a hallmark of 
both kinds of activities is that they characterize individual behavior that 
originates in a certain kind of commitment—to future action. In a joint 
activity characterized by a shared intention, each actor remains “ration-
ally committed” to realizing the joint end in question by seeking to give 
effect to the other actors’ intentions.145 And in a shared cooperative ac-
tivity, each actor also evinces a commitment to mutually support the 
other during the performance of the shared activity.146 Given the cen-
trality of commitment to activities characterized by a shared intention, it 
is crucial to understand what exactly a commitment is and how it re-
mains rather fundamentally different from incentives and desires that are 
taken to be the principal motivators of behavior among rational actors. 
Perhaps the best known attempt to unpack the nature of a commit-
ment and distinguish it from other kinds of motivations for behavior is 
that of Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen.147 In an early work 
criticizing the behavioral foundations of modern economic theory, Sen 
argues that individual behavior is routinely driven by “commit-
ment[s],”148 where a person often “choos[es] an act that he believes will 
yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is 
also available to him.”149 A commitment thus often involves a “counter-
preferential choice” which can draw a “wedge between personal choice 
and personal welfare.”150 Sen uses the idea of commitment to argue that 
certain kinds of human behavior are motivated by choices and elements 
 
145 See Bratman, Shared Intention, supra note 113, at 109. 
146 See Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 113, at 336–37. 
147 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 341, 
347–48 (1985); Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 317, 326 (1977) [hereinafter Sen, Rational Fools]; 
Amartya Sen, Why Exactly is Commitment Important for Rationality, 21 Econ. & Phil. 5, 8 
(2005).  
148 Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 147, at 326. 
149 Id. at 327. 
150 Id. at 328–29. 
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that do not necessarily correspond to the idea of preference-
maximization that economic theory takes as a given. Commitments in 
this understanding influence individuals to behave in ways that other 
kinds of “rewards and punishment[s]” cannot.151 Yet this need not sug-
gest that behavior flowing from a commitment is necessarily irrational, 
since it can routinely satisfy the demands of means-ends coherence and 
strong consistency.152 
In further developing the idea of a commitment, Sen makes the 
somewhat controversial claim that behavior based on commitment can 
involve a violation of “self-goal choice” (that is, the reality where an in-
dividual’s actions are chosen and guided by the pursuit of one’s own 
goals).153 In other words, what Sen is pointing to is the possibility that 
behavior emanating from a commitment often involves self-imposed 
constraints that restrict the realization of one’s own goals and prefer-
ences.154 To Sen, the principal source of such constraint is one’s “identi-
ty,” a variable heavily influenced by the considerations of community, 
group membership, and the like.155 
Philosophers of action have given the idea of a commitment more 
content, and in the process connected it to the concept of intention. To 
Searle, commitments are independent of an individual’s subjective mo-
tivations for action.156 A commitment is instead a “desire-independent 
reason for action.” It is, in other words, created independent of the 
agent’s own set of goals and preferences, and forms its own reason for 
action.157 In a similar vein, Bratman relates commitments to his theory of 
planning and treats them as constitutive of future directed intentions.158 
He further argues that commitments always carry with them a normative 
dimension, insofar as they guide and inform practical reasoning and 
planning in relation to future action.159 Commitments are thus funda-
mentally constitutive of intentions, and are in addition motivational. 
 
151 Id. at 334. 
152 See Bratman, supra note 139, at 109. 
153 Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, supra note 147, at 347. 
154 Id. at 348. 
155 Id. 
156 John R. Searle, Rationality in Action 167 (2001). 
157 Id. at 173. 
158 Bratman, supra note 139, at 107. 
159 Id. at 109 (“The normative aspect of commitment consists in the norms and standards 
of rationality associated with these roles.”). 
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Sen’s notion of commitment begins to assume much significance for 
discussions of collective intentionality—as a mechanism of explaining 
joint activities—only when one further unpacks his notion of “identity” 
as a constraint and treats it as an analytical (as opposed to empirical) de-
vice through which to understand interactions. The notion of constrain-
ing one’s goal choices by reference to those of a group/community of 
which one is a part can be understood through the working of collective 
intention. Professor Hans Bernhard Schmid adopts this approach and ar-
gues that the process of identification that Sen emphasizes is in reality a 
process of “self-contextualization” where an individual replaces his/her 
goals not with the goals of another, but instead with the goals of the col-
lective of which the individual is a member.160 The reason for action 
then originates in the shared goals—defined through the joint or shared 
cooperative activity—that each individual contributes to and simultane-
ously holds, and these goals are prioritized ahead of any individual 
goals, preferences, and desires that the individual may hold.161 A com-
mitment, in Schmid’s account, originates in the very nature of collective 
intention, since “[a]s normative sources, shared intentions, aims, goals, 
and projects provide [actors] with reasons for individual action.”162 
Commitments do not originate in subjective motivations, but they in-
stead take shape and color from the collective goals of the shared activi-
ty in question. They are instead “intersubjective.”163 Returning to our 
understanding of shared intention and the working of a shared coopera-
tive activity makes clear exactly how it is that commitments operate. 
Recall that in situations of a shared intention, it needs to be the case 
that both parties intend on doing a certain activity jointly.164 Yet the rea-
son for each of their intents is the other’s intent to do the same.165 Expec-
tations about how one’s intentions will influence the other’s, and general 
expectations about the other’s intentions and actions, are integral in this 
 
160 Hans Bernhard Schmid, Beyond Self-Goal Choice: Amartya Sen’s Analysis of the 
Structure of Commitment and the Role of Shared Desires, 21 Econ. & Phil. 51, 57 (2005). 
161 Id. at 59–61. 
162 Id. at 61 (emphasis omitted). 
163 Id. at 62. 
164 Bratman, Shared Intention, supra note 113, at 103–04. The explanation here uses Brat-
man’s reductive account of shared intention. The same logic would hold true for non-
reductive accounts as well. For a good example explaining the role of participatory commit-
ment in shared intention, but from a non-reductive perspective, see Abraham Sesshu Roth, 
Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments, 113 Phil. Rev. 359 (2009). 
165 Bratman, Shared Intention, supra note 113, at 104. 
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formation. As Bratman puts it, actors who have a shared intention “do 
not see each other’s relevant intention merely as a datum, for each in-
tends that the joint activity go in part by way of the efficacy of the oth-
er’s intention.”166 In so doing, each participant is driven by a commit-
ment to pursuing the means identified, overcoming obstacles, and 
realizing the joint activity in question.167 The parties’ collective creation 
of their shared objective (through the process of reciprocal reinforce-
ment) and the creation of intermeshing subplans produce these commit-
ments, which then provide the parties with sufficient (and independent) 
reasons for future action to realize the shared goal. Each actor “em-
brace[s] as her own end the efficacy of the other’s relevant intention.”168 
We now begin to see how, much as Sen argued before, participants in 
a joint activity with a shared intention are motivated to act not just ex-
clusively by their subjective motivations reflective of their individual 
preferences or desires, but also by their very adoption of the other par-
ty’s intention in conjunction with their own intention—the shared inten-
tion—as an independent and sufficient reason for action.169 Very often it 
will be the case that an individual’s preferences remain perfectly allied 
with the shared goal (or intention), which generates the commitment, 
since the individual is likely to have been motivated to participate in the 
creation of a shared intention precisely because of such preferences.170 
Yet once brought into existence, this shared intention embodies its own 
commitment, and becomes an independent reason for action that bears 
no subjective connection to the original preference. The same logic 
holds true, perhaps to an even stronger extent, in instances of shared co-
operative activity. 
Joint activities and shared cooperative ones both generate commit-
ments among actors as to their future behavior. They produce, ipso fac-
 
166 Id. at 109. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
169 Schmid, supra note 160, at 58. 
170 One must take care here to avoid the trap of simply redefining the actor’s motivational 
set of preferences to now encompass the act of commitment as a preference. In other words, 
it would be erroneous to simply argue that the actor was behaving in a certain way because 
of a preference that in turn reflected the commitment. To treat the commitment as embodied 
within the preference belittles the richness of human motivation, a point that Sen forcefully 
made in his early work. See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 147, at 322 (“It is possible to 
define a person’s interests in such a way that no matter what he does he can be seen to be 
furthering his own interests in every isolated act of choice.”). 
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to, commitments to future action.171 Once produced, they guide the ac-
tor’s practical reasoning about what to do and how to do it, ensure a 
strong consistency in the behavior during the subsistence of the com-
mitment, and constrain the introduction and viability of other reasons in-
to the practical reasoning process.172 
*** 
In summary then, a commitment represents (1) a reason for action, (2) 
that need not be (and is very often not) consequence-driven (that is, 
preference- or goal-based), and (3) that can on its own provide an actor 
with an independent motivation for action. Searle defines commitments 
as “the adoption of a course of action or policy . . . where the nature of 
the adoption gives one a reason for pursuing the course.”173 Applied in 
the context of shared intentionality, we thus see that the very process of 
generating such an intention produces a set of future-directed commit-
ments among actors. The actors’ individual agencies in generating the 
shared intention are equally responsible for motivating them through 
their commitments. Searle goes so far as to identify the ability to commit 
oneself in future actions as the “single most remarkable capacity of hu-
man rationality.”174 
C. The Collaborative Impulse 
Having examined the nature and structure of collective intentionality 
and the commitments that it entails, as well as the structure of commit-
 
171 Bratman, supra note 139, at 106. 
172 See id. at 109. It remains a source of deep disagreement among scholars, all of whom 
readily admit the motivational nature of commitments, as to whether the existence of such 
commitments also produces interpersonal obligations among the parties generating and sus-
taining a shared intention. Some, such as Bratman, vehemently deny the existence of any 
such obligations. Bratman, supra note 28, at 131–32. Others, most prominent among them 
Professor Margaret Gilbert, insist that shared intentions produce associational, as opposed to 
moral or legal, obligations. See Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the 
Social World 108 (2013). Yet others adopt a midway position and insist that shared intention 
is a normative phenomenon in the sense of generating some obligations through the process 
of mutual reliance, which is central to the process by which a shared intention is formed. It is 
somewhat irrelevant for our purposes whether the commitments that a shared intention pro-
duces further transform into obligations as well, since our primary concern is with the moti-
vational aspect of the commitment rather than its enforceability, or the consequences of de-
viation from it. 
173 Searle, supra note 156, at 174–75. 
174 Id. at 167. 
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ments more generally, we now proceed to unpack the idea of the ‘col-
laborative impulse,’ which builds on the central ideas from collective in-
tentionality and the working of commitments. 
As generally used today, an impulse refers to behavior that is sudden, 
or driven by an urge, commonly captured in the phrase “impulsive be-
havior.” Adopting the understanding of the early philosophy of action, 
however (dating back to the stoics), an impulse is simply a “psychologi-
cal event which determines or causes an action.”175 It is, in other words, 
the very cause “which makes it possible to ascribe intentionality to hu-
man behaviour.”176 In this understanding, which differs completely from 
the more common usage of the idea of impulsive behavior, behavior in-
fluenced by an impulse is hardly irrational or unthoughtful. It is instead 
a “call to action” produced by the mind, based on its acceptance of a cer-
tain object or goal as desirable.177 And it is entirely in this sense that the 
term is being used here: to connote a behavioral motivation produced by 
the mind that translates a commitment underlying an intention into de-
liberate action. 
An impulse is therefore the internal/motivational dimension of a fu-
ture-oriented commitment that causes an agent to behave in a way that is 
compliant with that commitment because the mind sees it as contextual-
ly appropriate or “right.” Recall that a characteristic feature of volitional 
commitments is that they tend to resist reconsideration even though they 
aren’t irrevocable as such.178 The resistance to reconsideration readily 
translates the commitment into action, as the future becomes the present. 
The impulse is then very simply the attitude that the actor embodies—in 
the present—when the commitment is converted into action and pro-
vides an independent reason for certain behavior in the present. 
Understood in this vein, the collaborative impulse refers to the behav-
ioral motivation that is generated at the time of action by an actor’s ac-
ceptance and internalization of the commitments that accompany a joint-
ly intentional activity. Although both jointly intentional and shared 
cooperative activities entail a commitment to jointly realizing the activi-
ty, recall that the latter (that is, shared cooperative activity) involves a 
heightened standard in that it embodies the additional commitment of 
 
175 Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism 47 (1985). 
176 Id. at 47–48. 
177 See Scott Rubarth, Stoic Philosophy of Mind, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
4a, http://www.iep.utm.edu/stoicmind/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
178 See Bratman, supra note 139, at 16–17. 
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mutual support.179 A shared cooperative activity is thus always a jointly 
intentional one, but not vice-versa. Actors in a shared cooperative activi-
ty might thus exhibit a cooperative impulse, motivating them to assist 
and support each other during the performance of the activity; yet actors 
in a jointly intentional activity merely exhibit a collaborative impulse 
that motivates them to realize the goal in question through the joint pro-
cess.180 In a jointly intentional activity, each participant intends the joint 
activity because of the other’s reciprocal intention to so perform it joint-
ly and the accompanying intermeshing subplans that allow their inten-
tions to coordinate in the realization of the final goal. Each actor’s inten-
tion is accompanied by (that is, underwritten by) a commitment that is 
relatively static over time and by default resists reconsideration. When 
the time for performance comes, that commitment generates the impulse 
that in turn motivates the actor to follow through on the original inten-
tion and perform the activity as a jointly intentional one. 
The working of the collaborative impulse is best illustrated through an 
example. Take two professional singers, Joe and Ann, who agree to sing 
a song together as a duet at a local event. Having performed the song to-
gether on multiple occasions in the past, they each know the lines that 
the other prefers to sing solo and accordingly divide up the song into the 
parts that they will sing together (in chorus) and the parts that each of 
them will sing individually. Translated into our discussion of collective 
intentionality: They each can be said to have an intention to jointly per-
form the song, an intention that in each emerges because of the other’s 
reciprocal intention to perform the song jointly. In addition, the intention 
is driven by and made up of their meshing subplans to each perform 
parts of the song such that the song as a whole is optimally performed to 
the best of their collective ability. In so generating the intention, each of 
them is driven by a future-looking volitional commitment that tends to 
resist reconsideration absent extreme circumstances. Thus, if Joe hears 
his favorite singer performing the same song solo on the radio the next 
day, this commitment underwrites the original intention and resists the 
 
179 Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 113, at 336–38. 
180 For an analogous but analytically different use of this distinction within the context of 
contract theory, see Markovits, supra note 131, at 1462. Drawing on the difference between 
jointly intentional and shared cooperative activities, Markovits distinguishes between what 
he calls “cooperative communities,” such as marriage, and purely “collaborative communi-
ties” characteristic of contracts. He then develops a full-blown moral account of such collab-
orative communities, noting that they exhibit “forms of respect that arise only unnaturally in 
connection with cooperation.” Id. 
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urge to simply abandon the idea of performing the song with Ann in fa-
vor of performing it solo. It is worth reiterating that this commitment is 
not an obligation that Joe owes to Ann, and Ann might well have told 
Joe that he is “free to change his mind” at any point.181 It is instead, qua 
Bratman, an attitude of mind in each actor that accompanies the inten-
tion.182 Having resisted reconsideration, when the time of the perfor-
mance arrives, Joe and Ann then each convert this intention into the 
jointly intentional activity and perform the song together. The same 
commitment that underwrote the intention and contributed to its stability 
now generates the motivation in both actors to convert the intention into 
action—by way of the collaborative impulse. 
Much of this will of course seem unexceptional. It might well be 
thought that Joe’s actions, based on his commitment, map onto his set of 
preferences when understood to include the reputational harm that aban-
doning Ann in the last minute might entail or some such similar conse-
quentialist variables. It thus bears emphasis that behavior driven by a 
collaborative impulse will generally be seen to align itself with utility-
maximizing behavior. The real nature of the impulse becomes obvious 
only when one observes a divergence between an actor’s actual behavior 
and what might be taken as the actor’s clear utility-maximizing choice. 
In an overwhelming majority of cases, the impulse and commitment un-
dergirding jointly intentional activity will remain aligned with what ap-
pear to be an actor’s immediate preferences, but the reality remains that 
they need not be so aligned. And when they are not aligned, the com-
mitment generates its own reasons for action. Therein lies the working 
of the commitment and its ability to produce behavior that is not neces-
sarily directly in furtherance of what appears to be the utility-
maximizing choice. Going back to our earlier hypothetical, assume that 
the day before Joe and Ann are to perform the song, Joe is approached 
by Mark and offered a million dollars to perform the work individually, 
(that is, as a solo). When he refuses to do so (and turns down the money) 
because of his commitment to jointly performing the song with Ann, he 
is clearly choosing an option that is not the obvious utility-maximizing 
one. Once again, he is not doing so out of an obligation to Ann, but out 
 
181 As noted previously, this is a point of disagreement between Bratman and Gilbert. See 
supra note 172.  
182 Bratman, supra note 139, at 17. 
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of a simple unwillingness to reconsider his commitment, and the conver-
sion of the commitment into an action: the collaborative impulse. 
Decades ago, Sen noted the possible convergence of behavior moti-
vated by a commitment and behavior influenced by utility maximization 
(that is, self-interest), and the difficulty involved in disaggregating an 
actor’s reasons when they overlap.183 He thus notes that the “more diffi-
cult question arises when a person’s choice [driven by a commitment] 
happens to coincide with the maximization of his anticipated personal 
welfare, but that is not the reason for his choice.”184 The working of the 
commitment—and its translation into an impulse—thus becomes appar-
ent only when a counterfactual condition actually exists and was abjured 
by the individual, and this is known to others assessing the behavior ex-
ternally. 
All of this raises an obvious question: Is behavior driven by the col-
laborative impulse necessarily rational at all times? When Joe turns 
down Mark’s lucrative offer in order to act on the commitment to jointly 
perform the song with Ann, in what sense is Joe’s behavior truly ration-
al? It remains a source of deep and continuing disagreement among phi-
losophers about whether a reason to act that is rationally formed but at 
the time of performance is seen as irrational comports with the overall 
idea of agent rationality.185 The nuances of this debate need not detain us 
here. All the same, philosophers seeking to provide a defensible recon-
ciliation of the paradox highlight a point that is of importance to us 
(namely, that the idea of rational self-interested behavior need not be 
seen as requiring an agent to be motivated exclusively by such self-
interest at all decision points).186 
The point is best understood by analogy to the distinction between 
rule consequentialism and act consequentialism. Both forms of conse-
quentialism agree that the value of an act ought to be measured by its 
 
183 See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 147, at 327. 
184 Id. 
185 For some of the most prominent work on this question, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons 3 (1986); Howard J. Sobel, Useful Intentions, in Taking Chances: Essays on Ration-
al Choice 237 (1994); Stephen L. Darwall, Rational Agent, Rational Act, 14 Phil. Topics 33, 
33–34 (1986); David Gauthier, Assure and Threaten, 104 Ethics 690, 694 (1994); Gregory S. 
Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 Analysis 33, 36 (1983); Joe Mintoff, How Can Intentions 
Make Actions Rational?, 32 Can. J. Phil. 331 (2002). 
186 See, e.g., David Gauthier, Commitment and Choice: An Essay on the Rationality of 
Plans, in Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour 217, 228–29 (Francisco Farina et al. 
eds., 1996); Joe Mintoff, Rule Worship and the Stability of Intention, 31 Philosophia 401, 
414–16 (2004). 
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consequences. Yet act consequentialism requires that the value of each 
individual act be measured against the consequences that it produces. 
Rule consequentialism on the other hand merely requires that the value 
of an act be measured against a set of predetermined rules or guidelines, 
which are in turn systemically taken to represent valuable consequenc-
es.187 The rule or guideline mediates (and constrains) the evaluation, ob-
viating the need for an empirical examination of an act’s consequences 
at each individual instance. The philosopher David Gauthier adopts pre-
cisely such an approach to defend as rational an agent’s actions that are 
irrational when performed but driven by a commitment that was rational 
when originally formed.188 He thus observes: 
[S]ometimes my life will go better if I am able to commit myself to an 
action even though, when or if I perform it, I expect that my life will 
not thenceforth go as well as it would were I to perform some alterna-
tive action. Nevertheless, it is rational to make such a commitment, 
and to restrict my subsequent deliberation to actions intentionally 
compatible with it, provided that in so doing I act in a way that I ex-
pect will lead to my life going better than I reasonably believe that it 
would have gone had I not made any commitment.189 
Gauthier’s formulation uses the metric of “life going well” as an 
open-ended consequentialist calculus. His defense of commitment-
driven action that is irrational at the time of performance derives from 
the idea that if it was rational at the time that it was entered into (rational 
by reference to the metric), it assumes a certain rationality even when 
actually performed, since the relevant metric is no longer the overall 
consequentialist idea of “life going well,” but rather the reason itself—
the commitment—which the agent undertook as furthering the conse-
quentialist idea.190 The aim (life going well) becomes manifested in the 
reason (the commitment), and the action then is measured against the 
reason rather than directly against the aim. The structure thus maps onto 
the rule consequentialism versus act consequentialism divide. 
 
187 See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/
consequentialism-rule/. 
188 See Gauthier, supra note 185, at 707. 
189 Id. 
190 See Hooker, supra note 187.  
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Bratman adopts a similar line of defense. He defends the rationality of 
behavior driven by commitment in situations where non-reconsideration 
(of the commitment) was driven by general habits that were reasonable 
(that is, rational) for the individual to have when they were first 
formed.191 Thus, one might posit that if Joe’s unwillingness to reconsider 
was driven by the general habit of avoiding the abandonment of a part-
ner in the last minute (as unethical), and one admits the reasonableness 
of that habit when developed, its application to the specific instance can 
indeed be seen as rational. The reasonableness of the general habit over-
rides its application to the specific instance, rendering the act rational. 
Once again, the “two-tiered” structure works to mediate the question of 
rationality.192 
In acting on the collaborative impulse that is in turn fueled by the 
commitment to jointly performing an action, the agent can be seen as 
furthering his/her self-interest only indirectly. The commitment mediates 
between the action and the self-interest, and as long as the commitment 
was formed in the pursuit of rational self-interest, actions based on it can 
be seen as indirectly furthering that self-interest even if, taken in isola-
tion, they seem to be counter-preferential. If one accepts this structure, 
behavior commenced in and undertaken for self-interest can indeed ac-
commodate individualized, non-self-interested action when a commit-
ment—initially driven by self-interest—intervenes and operates as a rea-
son on its own for such individualized action. The collaborative impulse, 
in other words, may sit comfortably within a broader instrumentalism 
motivating an agent’s overall behavior, even though on its own the im-
pulse is not driven by such instrumentalism. This nesting of the impulse 
within a broader utilitarian orientation reveals that an agent’s reasons for 
performing a joint activity may indeed be motivated by a plurality of 
considerations. 
Returning to our hypothetical, Joe may have initially been motivated 
to perform the song with Ann because of the belief that performing it 
with her will produce the best outcome and earn them together a large 
cash prize. His overall orientation to the action is thus unquestionably 
instrumental/consequentialist. In forming the intention to perform the 
song jointly, he develops a commitment to so performing the action that 
is intertemporally stable. Once formed, the commitment operates as its 
 
191 Bratman, supra note 139, at 64–70. 
192 Id. at 68; Mintoff, supra note 185, at 408 (describing Bratman’s theory as two-tiered). 
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own reason for action, allowing him to turn down Mark’s counteroffer. 
When the time comes for performance, it generates the collaborative 
impulse, which causes Joe to actually perform the song jointly with Ann. 
Now, while the impulse-driven behavior itself is not directly self-
interested, especially in the face of Mark’s offer, it sits perfectly within 
Joe’s overall consequentialist orientation since it was driven by a com-
mitment undertaken in the pursuit of an instrumental goal. In adhering to 
it, and in acting on it, Joe is hardly undermining his own consequential-
ism, if we understand the commitment itself as motivated by such con-
sequentialism and mediating between his aims (consequentialism) and 
actions. 
In short then, the collaborative impulse takes the commitment to 
jointly perform an activity as a sufficient reason for action, generally 
withstands immediate reconsideration, and motivates an agent’s collabo-
rative action in the performance of the activity. As noted before, it works 
within the interstices of regular utilitarian or consequentialist motiva-
tions and is often aligned with them, but its independence and sufficien-
cy as motivations are of central importance. 
In a sense, the collaborative impulse can be seen as lying on one end 
of an analytical—but not necessarily temporal—sequence of attitudes 
that an agent develops. The agent may thus be motivated by the benefi-
cial consequences of an activity and develop an intention to perform that 
activity jointly in order to best realize those benefits. In so developing a 
shared intention and intermeshing subplans, the agents develop a “web 
of intentions” that ensures a stable commitment to the joint activity. The 
commitment is a reason for action, and the shared intention in effect is 
now motivational. When the time comes for actually performing the ac-
tivity (that is, the intention being converted into action), the commitment 
to the joint activity produces the collaborative impulse, in turn generat-
ing collaborative behavior that is manifested externally. The diagram be-
low captures this analytic sequence. 
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Diagram: Analytic Sequence 
 
We now turn to examining how this matters for our understanding of 
unplanned coauthorship and the idea of mutual intent therein. 
III. UNPLANNED COAUTHORSHIP THROUGH THE COLLABORATIVE IMPULSE 
Having examined unplanned coauthorship, its reliance on the idea of 
intent, and the collaborative impulse that informs jointly intentional ac-
tivities, this Part moves to integrating the previous discussions by offer-
ing a new way of understanding copyright’s rules on unplanned coau-
thorship. Specifically, it offers an account of unplanned coauthorship 
that makes sense of courts’ overarching focus on intent and situates this 
focus within copyright’s broader goals and objectives. 
This Part begins by using the framework of jointly intentional activi-
ties described previously to understand coauthorship and the motivations 
of actors therein (Section III.A). It then attempts to situate the rules of 
unplanned coauthorship within copyright’s overall utilitarian frame-
work, specifically by showing how the idea of process-based motiva-
tions that are characteristic of collaborative creativity can work perfectly 
within copyright’s overall structure as a market-based inducement for 
creative output (Section III.B). Section III.C reconstructs the rules of 
unplanned coauthorship to focus on the process-based motivations dur-
ing the creative enterprise, using the device of mutual intent. Section 
III.D illustrates the working of the reconstructed rules using the facts of 
a well-known coauthorship decision. 
Collaborative 
Impulse 
Commitment 
to performing 
act jointly 
Shared 
Intention 
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A. Coauthorship as a Jointly Intentional Activity 
Bratman’s account of shared intentionality lends itself rather well to 
understanding the phenomenon of collective authorship. As an example, 
Professor Paisley Livingston, a philosopher of art, has recently attempt-
ed to develop an account of coauthorship using the idea of shared inten-
tionality.193 Describing himself as a “partial intentionalist,”194 Livingston 
develops an account of coauthorship using Bratman’s elements: 
[I]f two or more persons jointly author an utterance or work, they must 
intentionally generate or select the text, artefact [sic], performance, or 
structure that is its publicly observable component; in so doing, they 
act on meshing sub-plans and exercise shared control and decision-
making authority over the results; furthermore, in making the work or 
utterance, they together take credit for it as a whole . . . .195 
Livingston’s account, of course, cares very little about the legal frame-
work of coauthorship (that is, its role within the legal institution of copy-
right law). His account is therefore willing to admit ideas into its con-
ception of authorship and ownership that are legitimately alien to U.S. 
copyright law.196 All the same, it reveals to us the fundamental utility of 
using shared intentionality as a basis for recalibrating mutual intent, the 
“touchstone” of coauthorship under copyright law.197 
Choosing to make mutual intent the touchstone of coauthorship, as 
courts did early on, was therefore analytically sound. In so doing, courts 
were recognizing that the phenomenon of coauthorship is routinely ac-
companied by a joint (or shared/collective) intentionality. Drawing this 
connection out further sheds light on how the element of mutual intent 
 
193 See Paisley Livingston, Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study 75–89 (2005). 
194 Id. at ix. 
195 Id. at 83. 
196 For instance, Livingston cares very much about the difference between “first” and later 
authors, which matters from an attributive standpoint but has no legal implications. Id. at 85. 
In determining authorship, his account also emphasizes the extent to which a creator’s “sen-
sibility and attitudes” are manifested in the work. Id. 
197 See also Sondra Bacharach & Deborah Tollefsen, We Did It: From Mere Contributors 
to Coauthors, 68 J. Aesthetics & Art Criticism 23, 28–31 (2010) (using Margaret Gilbert’s 
account of collective intentions to understand coauthorship). For non-intentionalist versions 
of coauthorship, see Berys Gaut, Film Authorship and Collaboration, in Film Theory and 
Philosophy 149, 149–72 (Richard Allen & Murray Smith eds., 1997); Paul Sellors, Collec-
tive Authorship in Film, 65 J. Aesthetics & Art Criticism 266, 268–70 (2007). 
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can be meaningfully connected to copyright’s functioning and to its pre-
sumptive purpose. 
In Bratman’s account, described earlier, a joint activity is character-
ized by a shared intention wherein each participant has an “intention in 
favor” of the activity being done jointly.198 The process of coauthorship 
can be understood as a joint activity, manifesting all of the characteris-
tics demanded by Bratman’s reductive theory. In this sense, the intention 
guiding the activity is composed of both: (1) the simple intention to au-
thor the work (that is, by producing expression) and (2) the intention to 
do so jointly (that is, as a work of coauthorship). This composite inten-
tion, which we may call the intention to author the work jointly, is un-
dergirded by equivalent commitments in the parties. The shared inten-
tion to produce the work jointly is made up of the intermeshing subplans 
of the parties, wherein each contributor seeks to be, and in practice is, 
responsive to the other contributor’s subplans and actions, ensuring that 
they do not conflict but instead reinforce each other.199 The joint process 
of authoring the work is motivational rather than merely descriptive. In 
other words, each party’s reason for undertaking the task in question 
(that is, authoring expression) is driven in some part by the other party’s 
participation in it. Or, to use Bratman’s language, each party’s intention 
to perform the joint activity is “end-providing” to the other.200 
Copyright’s generally accepted account of authorial motivation is 
driven by its theory of incentives, an account that sits well with its over-
all utilitarian justification.201 According to this account, the copyright 
system works by promising prospective creators (that is, authors of orig-
inal expression) a set of marketable exclusive rights over their works, 
once brought into existence.202 The promise of these rights, and the ac-
companying market space that they carve out for the author, are thought 
to motivate (or “induce”) the very production of creative expression. 
While scholars have in recent times called this account into question, 
and questioned its comprehensiveness, copyright law and policy none-
 
198 Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 113, at 329. 
199 Bratman, Shared Intention, supra note 113, at 103–04. 
200 Bratman, supra note 28, at 102. 
201 For an overview of copyright’s theory of incentives, see Balganesh, Foreseeability and 
Copyright Incentives, supra note 4, at 1573; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483, 485 (1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric 
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1197 (1996). 
202 Lunney, supra note 201, at 492–93. 
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theless continue to accept its basic premises in their working.203 And not 
surprisingly, courts too endorse the theory and affirm the idea that copy-
right law exists as a mechanism of motivating authors to create original 
expression when called upon to interpret copyright doctrine or develop it 
contextually.204 
Accepting copyright’s purpose of authorial motivation for our pur-
poses though, what is particularly salient about it is its view of au-
thors/creators as entirely ends-focused in their orientations. Creators are 
presumed to derive their utility entirely from the market for their works 
of expression.205 Creativity and authorship are presumed to be meaning-
ful to the creator because of what they result in (namely, the work)—
which, in turn, is endowed with market potential as a result of copy-
right’s promise of exclusivity. The presumptive focus of the motivation 
underlying this account of authorial incentives thus lies in the product of 
the creativity rather than in its process. The ends of creativity are taken 
to be the driver of the process, with little attention paid to the possibility 
that the means themselves (that is, the process) might provide actors 
with their own set of motivations. Creativity can, however, be motivat-
ed, at least partially, by the very process of creation. 
To the extent that scholars of copyright law and creativity question 
the dominant account of authorial incentives, they base it on the broad 
distinction between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” motivations for creativi-
ty.206 Extrinsic motivations refer to incentives external to the creative 
task itself, while intrinsic motivations comprise “any motivation that 
 
203 For skeptical accounts, see Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Mar-
ketplace Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 522 (2009); Diane Leenheer Zimmer-
man, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 Theoretical Inquiries Law 29, 
30–32 (2011). 
204 As an example, consider the Supreme Court’s use of the incentives idea in this regard. 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[C]opyright’s purpose is to promote the crea-
tion and publication of free expression.”); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (observing how copyright is “in-
tended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special 
reward”). 
205 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (describing copyright as “a marketable right 
to the use of one’s expression”); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 
79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 220–21 (2004) (offering a fuller account of copyright’s economic 
theory using the economics of market-based product differentiation). 
206 See Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity in Context 15–16 (1996); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 11–12 (2010).  
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arises from the individual’s positive reaction to qualities of the task it-
self.”207 The category of intrinsic motivations suffers from an observable 
degree of incoherence and covers a wide variety of inducements ranging 
from the spiritual and moral to those originating in reputational conse-
quences, group dynamics, and personal satisfaction (or a “psychic re-
ward”).208 In addition, the very term “intrinsic” suggests a fundamentally 
non-instrumental orientation, when in fact several of the motivations 
covered by the category are indeed palpably instrumental. 
If coauthorship is understood as a jointly intentional activity, charac-
terized in turn by a composite intention wherein the joint nature of the 
creative enterprise forms some part of a creator’s reasons for undertak-
ing the creative activity, the motivational structure must be seen as em-
bodying both ends-based and means-based dimensions. This is hardly to 
suggest that the means-based dimension must necessarily be non-
instrumental all the time (though it may at times), since a means-based 
(or process-based) instrumentalism remains perfectly rational as a model 
of instrumental motivation. Instead of characterizing this form of moti-
vation as “intrinsic,” we might therefore call it “process-based,” in 
recognition of its means-orientation. This way of understanding coau-
thorship is also fairly consistent with the findings of various empirical 
studies involving group creativity. 
To take just one prominent example: In a study that has since become 
fairly well known, Professors Eric von Hippel and Georg von Krogh 
studied the nature of creator incentives in open source software devel-
opment, which consists of programmers who “voluntarily collaborate to 
develop software” and make it “freely available to all” through a mech-
anism of unrestrictive licensing.209 They conclude that the open source 
movement represents a “private-collective” innovation model that devi-
ates in significant respects from both a private investment model of crea-
tivity and a collective action model, the two dominant theoretical 
frameworks used to describe creator motivations.210 A large component 
of the participants’ motivations, they observe, originates in their very 
“participat[ion] in the project ‘community,’” which causes them to view 
 
207 Amabile, supra note 206, at 115. 
208 Zimmerman, supra note 203, at 44 n.60. 
209 Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the “Private-
Collective” Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 Org. Sci. 209, 209–10 
(2003). 
210 Id. at 212–13. 
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such cooperation, when “intense and sustainable,” as a net benefit on its 
own.211 Participating in the process of creating the work in question is 
thus seen as a benefit in itself, causing participants whose behavior 
would otherwise be characterized by a traditional prisoner’s dilemma to 
converge toward a common solution characteristic of a coordination 
game where the combination of market and non-market (that is, process) 
benefits produces a plausible equilibrium outcome.212 Such cooperation 
“‘reflects a transformation of individual psychology so as to include the 
feeling of solidarity, altruism, fairness, and the like’” since participation 
“‘becomes a benefit in itself.’”213 In short, an actor’s very participation 
in the process forms an integral part of his/her creative motivation. 
Central to coauthorship then, when the institution is understood as a 
jointly intentional activity, is that true participants in it embody a pro-
cess-based motivation toward the creative endeavor around which it re-
volves. This process-based motivation need not operate to the exclusion 
of a market-based (or ends-based) motivation, yet it certainly qualifies 
the latter’s role as the only reason for an actor’s engagement with the 
creative endeavor. 
To the extent that copyright law and policy purport to model them-
selves on the actual working of inducements in the production of crea-
tive works of expression, the law’s understanding of coauthorship must 
come to reflect a more nuanced formulation of creator motivations in 
joint activities. In addition, this is fairly easy to accomplish since it does 
not undermine copyright’s core utilitarian (and instrumental) orientation 
in any way or form, an issue to which we next turn. 
B. Coauthorship and Copyright’s Purposes 
It is almost incontrovertible dogma today that copyright’s main pur-
pose lies in inducing creative expression through a set of marketable ex-
clusive rights.214 While many have questioned the theory or sought to 
qualify it, the core idea that, as rational actors, creators can be motivated 
to produce an original work of authorship through a promise of exclu-
sive rights in that work, is today the accepted way of thinking about 
 
211 Id. at 216. 
212 Id. at 216–17. 
213 Id. at 216 (quoting Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx 132 (1986)). 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 200–04. 
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copyright law and policy.215 And as a result, it unquestionably influences 
the way that courts, scholars, and lawmakers think about copyright law. 
A key challenge for coauthorship in copyright law, ever since its 
emergence as a viable standalone doctrine, has been determining how 
and why it fits within copyright’s overall institutional justification: in-
ducing creativity. Since coauthorship—certainly in its unplanned mani-
festation—results in dividing up ownership of the work between coau-
thors, courts and scholars have overwhelmingly tended to view the 
doctrine in distributive terms and as diluting the dominant model of sole 
authorship.216 Perhaps more importantly though, copyright’s core idea of 
providing actors with incentives for creativity is seen as limited to the 
institution of sole authorship, with coauthorship then seen as a mecha-
nism that dilutes these incentives. Indeed, some regard it as a variable 
against which copyright’s goal of incentivizing creativity needs to be 
balanced.217 What is altogether missed in this approach, which views co-
authorship against the baseline of sole authorship rather than no creativi-
ty, is the possible role that coauthorship performs in preserving parties’ 
process-based motivations during the creative endeavor, thereby itself 
contributing to copyright’s overall structure as a mechanism of creative 
inducement. 
In committing itself to operating as an inducement for creative output, 
copyright law says very little about the precise causal dynamics of that 
inducement. The dominant understanding of creators as ends-based in-
strumentalists puts all of its focus on protecting the work of expression 
once produced, and thus on the assumption that creators care only about 
the marketable product. Nothing, however, either in the Constitution or 
indeed in copyright’s putative basic commitment to utilitarianism, pre-
vents its inducement structure from extending to process-based motiva-
tions embedded within copyright’s ends-based approach. In other words, 
to the extent that process-based motivations are in certain domains es-
sential to creative output, working to preserve them comports fully with 
copyright’s commitment to inducing creativity. The coauthorship in-
quiry might therefore form one of copyright’s principal mechanisms for 
 
215 Id. 
216 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Progress would 
be retarded rather than promoted, if an author could not consult with others and adopt their 
useful suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership of the work.”).  
217 See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Pre-
serving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 Emory L.J. 193, 198 n.24 (2001). 
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achieving this, by validating and protecting the process-based motiva-
tional structure that accompanies collaborative creativity when under-
stood as a jointly intentional activity. 
Unplanned coauthorship can fruitfully be seen as a legal mechanism 
for encouraging forms of creativity that benefit significantly from, or re-
ly entirely on, collaborative activity among two or more creators. It real-
izes this goal by minimizing strategic free riding during collaboration, 
thereby effectively preserving the parties’ process-based motivations for 
taking part in the creative process. This idea is best understood using Ar-
row’s information paradox. Arrow’s information paradox recognizes 
that in relation to informational resources that are non-excludable, a re-
source (that is, an informational good) cannot be evaluated by a buyer 
until it is disclosed, but upon such disclosure the buyer has no continu-
ing reason to want to buy it since the acquisition has already occurred.218 
Applied to collaborative creativity, Arrow’s information paradox sug-
gests that two (or more) creators might be wary of actively collaborating 
with one another and integrating their contributions into a unitary work 
for fear that one of them could lay claim to the work as a sole author and 
effectively deny the other all benefits.219 Unplanned coauthorship claims 
mitigate these risks to a significant degree, since they signal to the con-
tributors that each of their contributions to the work will be scrutinized 
objectively ex post to determine whether they obtain a co-ownership 
stake in the final work. Unplanned coauthorship then effectively under-
mines the possibility for strategic free riding by detaching the claim 
from one party’s unilateral authority and rendering the determination ob-
jective rather than subjective. 
Copyright’s mechanism of incentives is taken to work through the ex 
ante signal that the legal regime sends to putative creators. The promise 
of “authorship” as a legal title, and its economic consequences, are 
thought to motivate actors to create original works of expression.220 In 
this formulation, the authorship signal focuses entirely on the end in 
 
218 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 615 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).  
219 For similar applications in the context of transactions over intellectual property, see 
Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 785, 
794 (2011); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 
Tex. L. Rev. 227, 227 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. 
Rev. 709, 748 (2012). 
220 See sources cited supra note 204. 
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question (namely, the work). Analogously, the rules of coauthorship can 
be seen to send a specific message to actors motivated to engage in the 
production of creative works but who are motivated to do so for both 
ends-based and process-based reasons. The signal that coauthorship 
sends is that their collaboration in the production of the creative work 
will both: (1) result in the exact same legal title, authorship and its ac-
companying consequences and benefits, thereby recognizing that the 
overall project continues to remain unequivocally instrumental and ends-
based (that is, directed in significant part at the production of a creative 
work); and (2) deter strategic behavior by any one contributor to the col-
laborative endeavor, which might deter the collaboration, by according 
him/her all of copyright’s benefits. Notice that in both instances, the 
signal is tied to copyright’s idea of creator incentives, except that in the 
latter it creates space for process-based motivations to thrive within the 
overall ends-based orientation of the project. 
For the preceding claim to hold true, the collaboration that the catego-
ry of coauthorship is seen to preserve must, of course, be seen as valua-
ble and worthy of encouragement within the creative endeavor. It must, 
in other words, make for better quality works, or indeed a distinct set of 
works that would not be produced but for such collaboration. Yet this is 
hardly a major assumption. The copyright statute itself goes to some 
length to treat works characterized by such collaboration as fundamen-
tally different and afford them protection as an altogether independent 
category. The Copyright Act’s definition of coauthorship demands that 
the contributions of each party be merged into an “interdependent” or 
“inseparable” “unitary whole.”221 Indeed, the legislative history of the 
Act indicates that Congress went to some effort to distinguish a joint 
work from a mere “collective work,” with the latter characterized by sit-
uations where two or more works of authorship are merely compiled to-
gether without any sacrifice of their independent characters.222 A joint 
work thus requires contributions that, in a sense, speak to each other. 
Yet it is not sufficient that the contributions are merely integrated in the 
end. The Act also distinguishes joint works from mere derivative works, 
which build on preexisting works and often transform or adapt them.223 
 
221 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “joint work”). 
222 Id. (definition of “collective work”). 
223 Id. (defining a derivative work as a “work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
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In a derivative work, the derivative contribution (that is, the transfor-
mation or adaptation) certainly merges with the original work, and yet 
derivative works are not the same as joint works under the law. When an 
author produces a novel and years later it is converted into a movie, the 
novelist-author and the movie producer are not treated as coauthors, de-
spite the fact that their contributions are now inseparable and/or interde-
pendent in the final work (the movie). What distinguishes the derivative 
work from a joint work in these situations is the existence of a temporal 
lag between the contributions and the fact that each contribution was not 
initially created consciously with the design of being integrated into a 
whole, but instead as a contribution that could stand alone.224 Thus, a 
joint work requires both integration of the contributions and that this 
come about through the conscious design of the contributors—which, in 
short, necessitates actual collaboration between the parties. Consequent-
ly, the copyright system does recognize there to be significant value in 
the collaborative exercise needed to produce a true work of joint author-
ship, evidenced in its creation of an analytically separate category for 
such works. 
The institution of unplanned coauthorship thus remains perfectly 
aligned with copyright’s overall purpose of inducing creativity through 
the instrumentalism of the market. It is worth noting that this alignment 
is not simply because coauthorship provides creators with an independ-
ent incentive to collaborate when they otherwise would not. Such a 
claim would undermine the idea that coauthorship as a jointly intentional 
activity is independently motivated at least in part by process-based mo-
tivations. Within copyright’s overall structure as an inducement for crea-
tivity, coauthorship carves out a limited space for these process-based 
motivations to thrive, unimpeded by strategic behavior that might itself 
be encouraged by copyright’s overall instrumental orientation. Whether 
the rules of unplanned coauthorship exacerbate the incentive to collabo-
rate (rather than just preserve it) is of course a separate empirical ques-
tion. 
 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”). 
224 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5734 
(noting that even if the pre-existing work were created with an expectation that it would be 
transformed or adapted into another work, the lack of a “basic intention behind the writing of 
the work” for it to be integrated renders it a derivative as opposed to joint work). 
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C. Retaking Mutual Intent 
In using the idea of intention to understand works of joint authorship, 
courts were headed in the right direction. By emphasizing that the touch-
stone of coauthorship remains the idea of mutual intent, courts were 
drawing attention to the role of the parties’ motivations in creating the 
work, taken today to be the central premise behind the working of the 
copyright system. Yet, in employing a set of easy heuristics to decide 
cases of coauthorship—the “objective indicia”—courts have eventually 
come to undermine the very reason why copyright law ought to care 
about parties’ intentions as a normative matter. This Section translates 
these theoretical insights into prescriptions that courts might fruitfully 
adopt in applying the rules of unplanned coauthorship in order to give 
the idea of mutual intent meaningful analytical content compatible with 
copyright’s overall utilitarian orientation. 
1. The Irrelevance of Objective Indicia 
Despite courts’ lack of consensus on the nature of intention needed 
for coauthorship—routinely referred to as “mutual intent”—the idea of 
intention continues to remain the touchstone of the unplanned coauthor-
ship analysis. Over the years, scholars too have criticized courts’ reli-
ance on the notion of mutual intent, with some suggesting that it be cab-
ined in purely contractual terms and others recommending its 
elimination altogether from the coauthorship inquiry.225 
Understanding mutual intent in purely contractual terms would cer-
tainly simplify the concept quite dramatically. All the same, doing so 
would undermine the very utility of employing mutual intent as an ana-
lytical device in copyright law. In the contract law context, mutual intent 
(determined through objective evidence) enables courts to find the exist-
ence of a consensus ad idem, or a meeting of the minds, among the con-
tracting parties.226 As a species of promising, contract law is thought to 
enable parties to subordinate themselves to each other’s wills in the pur-
 
225 See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 217, at 255 (arguing for the elimination of mutual intent 
as the touchstone of coauthorship); Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint 
Authorship, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 123, 124 (2002) (arguing that mutual intent should be cabined 
in contractual terms). 
226 For an overview of this account, see Max Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human 
Will, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 575, 575 (1943).  
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suit of a common end.227 The core idea is thus that in so promising, each 
party subjects himself/herself to the other party rather than the common 
end in question. This in turn generates an obligation—to the other con-
tracting party—which produces its own set of normative ideals and be-
havioral motivations. The obligation to the other party—not the final 
goal—forms contract law’s exclusive concern, which explains why ideas 
such as “efficient breach” find little recognition as a doctrinal matter.228 
Superimposing contract law’s ideals and obligations over those of copy-
right law makes little sense then in the absence of an affirmative account 
aligning contract law’s normative goals with those of copyright law. 
Or put another way, recasting mutual intent in terms of parties’ con-
tractual obligations makes little sense unless we deem it normatively de-
sirable to treat their reasons for participating in the creative endeavor the 
same way we would treat any of their other contractual undertakings and 
not in purely instrumental terms, as is the case with copyright’s assump-
tions about creative motivation. To therefore impose the status of coau-
thors on parties because they are presumed to have contractually agreed 
to it—as an objective matter—locates the reasons for the imposition on 
an element of voluntariness associated with consequences rather than on 
any independent value in the phenomenon of coauthorship or collabora-
tive creativity. 
Eliminating mutual intent from the analysis altogether similarly mis-
understands the role that it plays. In criticizing the courts’ inconsistent 
approach to the idea, one scholar thus recommends eliminating the idea 
of intention in favor of a greater scrutiny of each author’s contribution to 
the final work to ensure that he/she made a “substantial copyrightable 
contribution” to the final work.229 This approach, she argues, will pro-
duce a more “efficient allocation of the economic rewards” associated 
with the copyright system.230 What this prescription misses altogether, 
and rather starkly, is the possibility that, in incorporating a reference to 
intention in discerning coauthorship, copyright law and policy are com-
 
227 See Markovits, supra note 131, at 1432 (“A promisor therefore intends, within the 
sphere of the promise, to defer to her promisee and indeed to subordinate her ends to her 
promisee’s will.”). 
228 See, e.g., Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New De-
fenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939, 1944–45 (2011); Craig S. Warkol, 
Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 321, 321–22 (1998). 
229 LaFrance, supra note 217, at 255–56. 
230 Id. at 263. 
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mitting themselves to more than just the normative goals of efficient re-
source allocation, and to recognizing the diverse origins of the motiva-
tion to create works of expression, when such creation entails a collabo-
ration among actors. 
In a recent paper examining the interface between collaborative crea-
tivity and organizational theory, Professors Anthony Casey and Andres 
Sawicki suggest that copyright’s rules on coauthorship should be seen as 
solving “team-production problems” characteristic of collaborative crea-
tivity.231 The problems of observability, verifiability, allocation (of input 
to output), and uncertainty—that in their analysis accompany collabora-
tive creation—necessitate solutions that “facilitate efficient ownership 
and control,” the hallmark of team-production firms.232 While they right-
ly point to the failings of the current objective indicia-based approach, 
they rather hastily fault the rules of coauthorship for “d[oing] nothing” 
to facilitate efficient collaborative creativity.233 The fallacy of their ar-
gument, however, lies in its complete (and somewhat surprising) neglect 
of copyright’s emphasis on intention and its role in the coauthorship in-
quiry. Not once do they identify, let alone validate, the emphasis that 
courts have placed on the question of intent. This leads them to rather 
simplistically conclude that the coauthorship inquiry should just stick to 
ensuring that each author makes an inseparable or interdependent con-
tribution to the whole, and that it ought to additionally detach the ques-
tion of authorship from ownership.234 
In beginning from the premise that copyright law is concerned exclu-
sively with creating an efficient ownership framework for creative prod-
ucts, their paper altogether neglects the possibility that it could harbor 
other considerations and serve additional purposes that originate in the 
very nature of collaborative creativity, rather than organizational theory. 
And the current structure of the coauthorship inquiry, with its focus on 
intention, can be seen as going quite some distance in realizing this. In-
deed, if efficient resource allocation were all that copyright law cared 
about, we might have not only different rules for coauthorship but also a 
very different basic framework for the institution as a whole.235 The key 
 
231 See Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1683, 1716 (2013). 
232 Id. at 1718, 1720. 
233 Id. at 1718. 
234 Id. at 1720–21. 
235 See Balganesh, The Normative Structure of Copyright Law, supra note 4, at 313. 
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lies instead in formulating an approach to mutual intent that focuses on 
the pluralist motivation that is characteristic of collaborative creativi-
ty.236 Before doing so however, it is important to examine how exactly 
courts’ current approach to mutual intent—through the use of objective 
indicia—fails the coauthorship inquiry. 
The fault with mutual intent lies in the way in which courts have op-
erationalized it. In attempting to steer clear of any reliance on subjective 
motivations, which they rightly recognized as open to manipulation, 
courts developing the rules of unplanned coauthorship have emphasized 
their reliance on an objective standard of intention for the concept of 
mutual intent. As an idea, this move certainly made a lot of sense at the 
time, especially given the problems with subjective state of mind that 
have come to be well recognized in other areas of law. Constructing mu-
tual intent as an objective matter then of course necessitated a reliance 
on circumstantial evidence of the parties’ behavior. And to make this 
process easy, courts came to develop a set of “objective” indicia or prox-
ies, supposedly taken to be indicative of parties’ objective state of mind. 
Therein began the problem. 
As courts began to rely on the objective indicia to find the presence or 
absence of mutual intent, in due course the indicia came to assume a life 
of their own. Courts deciding cases of unplanned coauthorship began to 
apply the criteria mechanistically and formulaically, with little regard for 
the principal purposes underlying their very use. Consequently, in innu-
merable cases, courts’ rote invocation of the indicia seems palpably 
counterintuitive to the coauthorship inquiry and makes very little analyt-
ical sense, a reality that other scholars have noted as well. 
Consider the best-known objective indicium that courts use today: the 
parties’ relative “decision-making authority” during the creation of the 
work in question.237 In general, when one party (the dominant party) re-
tains most or all such control, courts are reluctant to find the work to 
have been coauthored despite the magnitude or centrality of the other’s 
contributions.238 In one well-known case, the Ninth Circuit treated this 
 
236 For a less extreme critique of the intent requirement in coauthorship, see Zemer, supra 
note 24, at 623 (describing the problems of unfettered discretion that enter under the rubric 
of intention, but arguing that it remains an element in the analysis, even if not the sine qua 
non of coauthorship). 
237 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson v. Larson, 147 
F.3d 195, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061, 1071–72 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
238 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235–36; Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202–05.  
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element as dispositive of the question, declining to find coauthorship be-
cause the dominant author was “not bound” to accept any of the other 
contributor’s recommendations and such “absence of control [wa]s 
strong evidence of the absence of coauthorship.”239 As a preliminary 
matter, it is not clear what the connection is between the distribution of 
decision-making authority and the question of coauthorship. Two or 
more authors can certainly produce a joint work even when one of them 
is given a complete veto in determining what goes into the final work. 
Such a veto may merely reflect their relative competence or experience. 
Indeed, this is fairly well accepted as a norm in the scientific communi-
ty, where the lead scientist who heads a research laboratory presumably 
controls the direction of the experiment and the final writing of the pub-
lication, but nonetheless shares authorship with others in the facility who 
contribute to the experiment and participate in the writing of the paper. 
The default of “distributed control” for coauthorship thus seems blatant-
ly unrealistic, especially when used as an evidentiary matter. Indeed, a 
close examination of the origins of this indicator reveal that it emerged 
from courts’ scrutiny of parties’ relative contributions to the work, under 
the (independently faulty) reasoning that a party contributing peripheral 
or non-important expression was unlikely to have been seen by the other 
as a coauthor.240 The idea of relative contribution gave rise to the use of 
relative “control” as a proxy for such contribution, which in due course 
assumed a life of its own. 
The same can be said of “the way in which the parties bill or credit 
themselves,” another well-known indicator that courts use in the deter-
mination.241 In situations where one party is credited on the final work as 
anything but an author when the work is finalized, courts impute an af-
firmative intent to the other author to be treated as the sole author, there-
by negating a finding of the requisite mutual intent. Once again, this pre-
sents multiple problems. First, merely because a contributor is listed as 
something other than an author is hardly reflective of the fact that the 
party consciously intended that contributor not to have the legal status of 
a coauthor. The dominant author’s decision to list himself as “author,” 
“composer,” or “director,” and the other contributor as “dramaturg,” 
“consultant,” or mere “contributor” is no more than an indication of an 
 
239 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235. 
240 See LaFrance, supra note 217, at 229–30. 
241 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 203 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 
1991)). 
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intended lack of parity among the parties. Yet this has little to do with 
their legal statuses as such, which may not have been in contemplation 
at all. Second, in many situations, such billing and crediting takes place 
at the end of the entire process, after both parties have made their contri-
butions. The dominant author is thus in a position to deny the other con-
tributor the status of coauthorship as a formal (titular) matter, without 
risking the latter’s contribution to the project. Using actual billing and 
crediting as a variable in the inquiry thus does little to alleviate this situ-
ation and is susceptible to the same kinds of strategic posturing that 
courts worry about in the context of using subjective intent, specifically 
that ex post (that is, during trial), each party has an incentive to recon-
struct its past intent in its own favor. Once again, the origins of this vari-
able lie in courts’ attempts to discern the parties’ relative contributions 
to the work to determine coauthorship, for which they came to use the 
parties’ self-designated statuses as a proxy. In due course, the determina-
tion of these statuses came to be treated as worthwhile on its own, even 
though as a logical matter it bears little direct connection to the question 
of coauthorship. 
In short then, while the turn to objective evidence in lieu of subjective 
motivation may have had obvious benefits, courts’ further use of specif-
ic indicators or “indicia” as shortcuts for the process has resulted in the 
inquiry routinely bearing no direct connection to the underlying question 
of coauthorship, except in a very attenuated sense. As a result, the in-
quiry—as undertaken by courts today—does little justice to the way in 
which the institution of coauthorship, as a collaborative enterprise, actu-
ally works, and the interface between ends and means that it invariably 
produces and requires actors to navigate. What the mutual intent inquiry 
needs, in place of the formulaic objective indicia, is a process that allows 
courts to grapple directly with the conflicting demands and motivations 
that collaborators encounter when producing a putative work of joint au-
thorship. 
2. Mutual Intent as the Search for a Collaborative Impulse 
The suggestion that courts eliminate their reliance on objective indicia 
for the unplanned coauthorship analysis certainly does not imply that 
they should simultaneously avoid all reliance on mutual intent as well. 
To the contrary, that would be throwing the baby out with the bath wa-
ter. The insistence that it is contributors’ intentions that provide works of 
joint authorship (that is, joint works) with their distinctiveness recogniz-
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es that these works are accompanied by a shared intentionality during 
their creation. And as discussed previously, this intentionality consists of 
a motivation to participate in the creative collaboration in part because 
of the collaborative nature of the process. We identified this as a pro-
cess-based motivation that is capable of subsisting within an overall mo-
tivation in favor of the final end in question (namely the production of 
the work itself). Mutual intent should thus remain the touchstone of the 
unplanned coauthorship inquiry and should come to be used by courts to 
look for the presence of the process-based motivation previously identi-
fied. It should, in other words, be a conduit for courts to inquire whether 
the parties in question were motivated to produce the work by the col-
laborative nature of the undertaking. 
Recall that the intention to participate in the production of a work be-
cause of its joint nature (that is, the joint intention) is underwritten by a 
commitment to the joint nature of the activity, which in turn produces—
at the time of action—a collaborative impulse.242 The collaborative im-
pulse, in other words, represents the translation of the motivation or in-
tention (which is a state of mind) into action, which then results in a par-
ticular result: the creative work. As the external manifestation of the 
motivation, the collaborative impulse forms a viable probative target for 
assessing whether the production of the creative work was in fact ac-
companied by the process-based motivation that distinguishes coauthor-
ship as a joint activity. In effect, this converts the search for a mutual in-
tent into the search for a shared intention accompanying the creative 
process, the hallmark of a joint activity. Recasting mutual intent along 
these lines makes courts’ reliance on it as the sine qua non of coauthor-
ship both justifiable and analytically meaningful. 
The justification for connecting mutual intent to the collaborative im-
pulse originates in large part from the Copyright Act’s own rationale in 
distinguishing “joint work[s]” from both collective works and derivative 
works by insisting that a particular kind of collaboration be present for 
works in the first category, as we noted earlier.243 Yet, the Act and the 
accompanying legislative history say very little about what exactly it is 
that the scrutiny of the kind of collaboration is geared toward. Each ac-
tor’s contribution is required to relate to the other’s such that they to-
gether form an integrated whole, and in addition, such integration must 
 
242 See supra Part II. 
243 See supra text accompanying notes 74–93. 
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have been consciously designed—both in order to preserve the distinct 
category of joint works. But why? Qua works, joint works are treated no 
differently from other works. They obtain the same set of protections 
and are subject to the same limitations and exceptions as non-joint 
works. Qua author, each coauthor also obtains the same rights and privi-
leges as regular authors. Why go to such lengths and impose additional 
adjudicative costs on courts in order to carve out an independent catego-
ry? 
The reason seems to lie in the way copyright law divides ownership 
between the contributing authors. The law in effect imposes a regime of 
governance between the authors inter se owing to the collaborative pro-
cess through which the work was produced. Imposing this governance 
regime on creators makes sense only if the distinct form of collaboration 
that it is premised on itself contributes to the output of creativity, copy-
right’s primary goal. Indeed, absent such a reality, coauthorship might 
legitimately be seen as a countervailing consideration to copyright’s 
overall purpose, an issue adverted to previously. Consequently, using 
mutual intent to test whether the collaborative process itself contributed 
to the creative work (that is, whether the creative process evidenced a 
collaborative impulse) seems both analytically and instrumentally defen-
sible. In short, a court’s search for mutual intent must involve asking 
whether the collaborative impulse played any meaningful role in the 
production of the work. 
How then might courts go about looking for the collaborative impulse 
and determining its role in the creative process? The obvious first step is 
to more closely scrutinize the actual process of collaboration through 
which the work is created. While courts certainly do take notice of the 
creative process under the current standard (that is, the objective indi-
cia), they do so primarily to make sure that each party contributed actual 
expression to the work, rather than mere ideas or other unprotectable 
material.244 The scrutiny never extends to discerning or inferring parties’ 
motivations for creativity during the process, and their connection to the 
parties’ relationship. Courts’ current form of scrutiny is further muddied 
 
244 A good illustration of this phenomenon is Childress, where the court provides us with 
an elaborate overview of the collaboration between the parties. Childress, 945 F.2d at 502–
04. Yet, the court uses this overview largely to answer the question of copyrightable contri-
butions. Id. at 504–07. The use of this factual information in the analysis of mutual intent is 
fairly limited. Id. at 509. 
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by their overreliance on the objective indicia as ends in themselves ra-
ther than as devices through which they understand the collaboration. 
The analysis would be best served by a direct examination of parties’ 
incentives during the collaboration, based of course on objective evi-
dence of the creative process. Courts should be looking for evidence of 
considerations having entered parties’ creative behavior, which suggests 
that the collaboration was providing creators with an impulse of its own 
for their endeavor. 
a. Intermeshing Subplans 
Jointly intentional activities are characterized by each actor undertak-
ing the project at least in part because of the other’s involvement and 
possession of a reciprocally equivalent reason.245 This is described as an 
intention held by each actor to perform the activity jointly, where the 
joint nature of the activity is motivational to the performance rather than 
merely descriptive. These reciprocal (or mutual) intentions in turn work 
by generating intermeshing subplans, where each actor’s steps are in 
some minimal sense responsive to the other’s.246 In this formulation, the 
intermeshing subplans are a direct manifestation of the shared intention, 
or evidence of the process-based reasons for the actor’s involvement. 
The search for the collaborative impulse as part of the mutual intent ex-
amination should thus look for evidence of intermeshing subplans dur-
ing the collaboration between the putative coauthors. 
These intermeshing subplans can take a wide variety of shapes and 
forms during the collaboration to produce the copyrightable work of ex-
pression. The intermesh can range from the two authors working closely 
to modify each of their own contributions in light of the other’s, to two 
authors working together to co-produce original expression. When two 
people set out to write a work of fiction and chain together a series of 
events in the form of a chain novel, each of their contributions is respon-
sive to the other’s, at least insofar as it does not directly contradict the 
other’s contribution. Another example of such intermesh is the tradition-
al collaboration between a lyricist and a composer in the production of a 
musical work, such as the collaboration between George and Ira Gersh-
win. The composer’s music is responsive to the lyrics chosen by the lyr-
icist, which are in turn driven at least in some part by the composer’s 
 
245 Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, supra note 113, at 329. 
246 Bratman, Shared Intention, supra note 113, at 103–04. 
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choice of melody, tempo, and rhythm.247 In both situations, each party’s 
contribution to the work is responsive to the other’s and is modified re-
ciprocally in an effort to produce an integrated whole. The collaboration 
thus presumptively generates an additional reason for the creative out-
put. 
Very importantly, the intermeshing subplans do not have to be at the 
level of expressive content. In other words, it should be sufficient to es-
tablish—in relation to the search for reciprocal motivations—that one 
author’s contributions at the expressive level were influenced and moti-
vated by mere ideas provided by the other, unprotectable under copy-
right law on their own. While it is certainly true that copyright law and 
policy care very little about incentivizing mere ideas (or factual collec-
tion) through the provision of exclusive rights,248 ensuring that each au-
thor contributes some expression to the joint work already takes place at 
the first step of the coauthorship inquiry.249 To bootstrap that require-
ment into the element of mutual intent would ensure a level of redun-
dancy that ought to be avoided. Additionally, the theory of jointly inten-
tional activities itself does not demand such a circumscribed analysis, 
and recognizes the possibility that subplans can manifest themselves at 
varying levels of abstraction, in relation to outputs. All that matters is 
that both actors show some meaningful reciprocal motivation, for which 
intermeshing subplans provide the best evidence. 
As an illustration, consider two writers—Jack and Mary—who em-
bark on the project of writing a novel together, which they decide will 
contain eight chapters. Jack begins by writing the first five chapters of 
the novel. Mary then reads Jack’s chapters and before she begins writing 
her own chapters, gives Jack some thoughts on where she intends to take 
the story and develop the characters in it. Based on this feedback, Jack 
then decides to rewrite significant portions of his five chapters while 
Mary is working on her three chapters, such that when Jack is finished 
 
247 For a comprehensive account of collaboration in the songwriting process, including a 
detailed taxonomy of the forms that this might take, see Joe Bennett, Collaborative Song-
writing: The Ontology of Negotiated Creativity in Popular Music Studio Practice, J. on Art 
Rec. Production, Issue 5 (July 2011), http://arpjournal.com/875/collaborative-songwriting-
the-ontology-of-negotiated-creativity-in-popular-music-studio-practice/. For a specific study 
of the collaboration between the Gershwins, see Deena R. Rosenberg, Fascinating Rhythm: 
The Collaboration of George and Ira Gershwin (1997). 
248 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207 n.5 (1954); 1 Nim-
mer, supra note 70, § 2.03[D]. 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 68–73. 
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with his rewrite and Mary with her chapters (assume that Jack has no 
comments on Mary’s chapters), the novel is essentially done. Unpacking 
the collaboration in terms of copyright’s rules on coauthorship, we see 
that both Jack and Mary contributed expressive content to the work. 
Moving to the element of mutual intent, we can also legitimately infer 
that both Jack and Mary were reciprocally motivated in the project by 
the other’s involvement and contributions. Jack’s reciprocal motivation 
is evidenced in the extensive rewrite that he engaged in, and Mary’s in 
the reality that her contributions were based on Jack’s own contributions 
and integrated into it. It is also true that the evidence of Jack’s reciprocal 
motivation shows that it originated not from Mary’s expressive contribu-
tions as such, since at the time of his rewrite Mary was yet to produce 
any actual expression; but they were principally driven by Mary’s ideas 
and suggestions communicated at a more abstract level. This ought to 
matter little, since it remains clear that both parties were reciprocally 
motivated by the collaboration and developed intermeshing subplans 
during the production of the work. 
Locating intermeshing subplans to discern a collaborative impulse 
among actors necessitates probing through the creative process in great 
detail. An obvious question for the jury,250 parties should be required to 
present as much information as is available about the collaboration in 
question: various versions of their contributions (illustrating possible re-
ciprocal modification), correspondence between them (revealing the in-
termesh), evidence of actual assistance rendered to each other during the 
production of the work, and any additional evidence indicating that they 
had chosen to work together on the project because of the belief that 
their interaction would produce a better result (that is, that the final 
product would be more than just the sum of their individual contribu-
tions to it). 
b. Intermesh Versus Integration 
The search for intermeshing subplans will not be satisfied by the mere 
integration of the parties’ respective contributions into a unitary work. 
Indeed, such an interpretation would be palpably tautological by collaps-
ing the mutual intent inquiry into a mere examination of whether the 
 
250 See Sutton Imp.-Exp. Corp. v. Starcrest of Cal., 762 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(finding that the question of joint authorship is a question of fact). This is not to suggest that 
the matter may not be decided on a motion for summary judgment. 
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contributions were “inseparable” or “interdependent.”251 In addition, the 
intermesh must involve the basic question of substantiality, since its role 
is to provide evidence of the fact that one party was motivated to con-
tribute to the work in some meaningful part by the other’s reciprocal in-
tention and contribution. If one party makes a fairly minimal contribu-
tion, measured in both quantitative and qualitative terms, which does in-
indeed find its way into the final work, it would be accurate to say that 
the parties’ contributions were interdependent and integrated into a uni-
tary whole. Yet it would be inaccurate to say that they had intermeshing 
subplans that amount to evidence of a collaborative impulse motivating 
both parties’ actions; since the party contributing most of the expression 
cannot be said—based on such evidence alone—to have been motivated 
in some meaningful part by the other’s minimal contributions. Recall 
that intermeshing subplans entails actors coordinating their behavior in a 
way that does not just produce the common goal in question, but that in 
addition seeks to realize that goal jointly.252 Thus when one party con-
tributes minimally to the final work, the mere fact that his/her contribu-
tion was integrated into the work does not reflect the level of coordina-
tion needed to rise to the level of intermeshing subplans. 
The extensiveness and significance of the parties’ collaboration are 
thus as important as the very existence of such collaboration, in search-
ing for the collaborative impulse. The search for intermeshing subplans 
must internalize this reality. This is also not simply the isolated question 
of finding a substantial (or more than de minimis) contribution, since 
that alone need not suggest intermeshing subplans.253 Two parties can 
produce their contributions completely independently, and following 
such production choose to merge them into a unified whole at the end. In 
this situation again, while the contributions are certainly substantial and 
interdependent, they are hardly reciprocally motivated by the collabora-
tive impulse (that is, neither party’s contribution was meaningfully driv-
en in part by the other’s contribution). For an intermesh to thus exist and 
serve as evidence of the collaborative impulse, there must therefore be a 
 
251 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “joint work”). 
252 See supra text accompanying notes 115–19.  
253 Some courts have treated a “substantial and significant contribution” as an independent 
requirement of the coauthorship analysis. This approach originated in cases decided under 
the pre-1976 law. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, No. 87 Civ. 6924, 1990 WL 196013, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1990) (quoting Picture Music v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 647 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).  
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collaborative process through which the final work was produced and in 
which the contributions are integrated; and the parties’ contributions 
within that process must be substantial and meaningful so as to be plau-
sibly motivational. 
Measuring the substantiality of the subplans is not the same as meas-
uring the substantiality of each party’s contribution, though the two 
might often overlap and seem similar. In the latter, the question is simp-
ly an examination of what one party produced measured against the final 
whole, with an eye toward comparing it against the other party’s contri-
butions, in an effort to ensure a measure of equity between them. The 
former, however, entails examining what each party contributed during 
the collaboration, not simply to compare it to the other’s but instead to 
assess whether it might have been valuable enough so as to have had an 
influence on the other party’s own contribution. The difference is thus 
subtle but important, and lies in the purpose behind the inquiry. 
Measuring the substantiality of the subplans might seem overly sub-
jective, and perhaps contrary to copyright’s basic ideal of “neutrality.”254 
Yet it must be remembered that courts routinely undertake precisely 
such an inquiry as part of the “substantial similarity” analysis, where 
they examine whether the defendant’s copying was quantitatively and 
qualitatively significant enough to be wrongful before making a finding 
of infringement.255 In a largely similar vein, the question here should 
thus be whether each party’s contribution during the collaboration was 
quantitatively and qualitatively significant enough so as to be plausibly 
constitutive of the other’s reasons for producing his/her contributions. 
Introducing the idea that the intermesh involves an element of sub-
stantiality serves, in addition, to alleviate a major concern that seems to 
have influenced courts in their analysis of the coauthorship question 
(namely that one coauthor might obtain an ownership stake in the work 
that is disproportionate to his/her contribution to the work).256 Such 
“overreaching contributors,”257 who provide insignificant expression 
during the collaboration, would under this formulation be unable to es-
 
254 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 303, 304–07 (1991); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aes-
thetic Theory, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 247, 300 (1998). 
255 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2004); Twin Peaks Prods. v. 
Publ’ns Int’l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1376–77 (2d Cir. 1993). 
256 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2000). 
257 Id. at 1235 (quoting Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
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tablish any shared intentionality during the production of the work and 
thus fail to satisfy the requirements of coauthorship. 
c. Contractualization 
In addition, courts should also consider evidence of factors that might 
have the effect of either diluting or strengthening the working of the col-
laborative impulse as an independent motivation among the parties. One 
such factor is the contractualization of the parties’ collaborative relation-
ship through the market. It is very often the case involving two collabo-
rators that one of them is being compensated or was hired or commis-
sioned by the other for his/her participation in the creative endeavor. In 
various contexts, scholars and empiricists have shown that the introduc-
tion of market-based motivations into an actor’s reasons for action can 
have the effect of either diminishing (that is, “crowding out”) other pre-
existing non-market motives, or alternatively of strengthening (that is, 
“crowding in”) their influence.258 This phenomenon is referred to as the 
“motivation crowding effect.”259 It thus need not be the case that simply 
because parties structure their collaboration in contractual terms, they 
cannot evince a collaborative impulse during their actions. Determining 
whether the contractualization diminishes or exacerbates the collabora-
tive impulse requires a closer scrutiny of how exactly the parties reacted 
to the contractual arrangement during their actual collaboration. In some 
instances, the hired creator may view the contract as delegating the crea-
tive endeavor as a whole to her, and requiring her to produce a creative 
output that is entirely (or for the most part) hers, with any input from the 
other actor being suggestive at best.260 In these situations, the contractu-
alization effectively crowds out the collaborative impulse as a motiva-
 
258 For early work identifying this idea, see Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: 
From Human Blood to Social Policy 223 (1970). Economists and psychologists have since 
empirically investigated Titmuss’s initial theory. For a sample of this work, see Edward L. 
Deci & Joseph Porac, Cognitive Evaluation Theory and the Study of Human Motivation, in 
The Hidden Costs of Reward: New Perspectives on the Psychology of Human Motivation, 
149, 155–57 (Mark R. Lepper & David Greene, eds., 1978); Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-
Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic 
Motivation, 125 Psychol. Bull. 627, 632 (1999); Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Me-
diated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 105, 114 (1971). 
For a recent survey of these studies, see Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding 
Theory, 15 J. Econ. Surveys 589, 606 (2001). 
259 Frey & Jegen, supra note 258, at 589–90. 
260 As an example, consider the case of Childress v. Taylor, No. 87 Civ. 6924, 1990 WL 
196013, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1990), discussed infra Section III.D. 
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tion and replaces it with its own set of (new) reasons. Yet in other situa-
tions the contract between the parties may recede into the background 
once the relationship is brought into existence, after which the creative 
process takes on a genuinely non-contractual flavor where neither party 
is seen to be motivated to generate a creative output as a purely contrac-
tual obligation. Here, the contract is in effect crowding in and stimulat-
ing the collaborative impulse. Consequently, the mere existence of a 
contract between the parties is hardly probative on its own, but ought to 
be scrutinized within the context of overall collaboration that ensues 
from it. 
In speaking of the motivation crowding effect here, care must be tak-
en to avoid the trap of equating the contractualization of the collabora-
tion with the presumptively market-driven nature of the task that the par-
ties are engaged in (namely, the production of a marketable creative 
output). The effect being considered is simply of exogenous variables 
influencing the process-based structure of the collaborative impulse, 
which to be sure is embedded into an overall instrumentalist (and mar-
ket-based) orientation. 
From an evidentiary standpoint, the most obvious puzzle in discerning 
the presence of a collaborative impulse arises in situations where the 
parties have agreed in advance contractually, about the nature of their 
statuses. Two or more collaborators may thus agree contractually that 
they should be treated as coauthors, or instead that one of them will be 
the sole author of the work. In these situations, should courts treat the 
agreement as dispositive of the question of coauthorship? From a purely 
objective standpoint, an agreement between the parties on the question 
of authorship should have little say on their legal statuses, which depend 
entirely on their actions, behavior, and motivations during the collabora-
tion.261 Thus, two creators cannot simply combine their preexisting 
works to create what is in effect a collective work, and then create an 
agreement claiming to be coauthors of a joint work. Such an agreement, 
 
261 Some courts seem to take the position, erroneously, that the question of coauthorship 
does not require an objective determination at all if the parties enter into a contract to that 
effect. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (“[S]everal factors suggest themselves as among the 
criteria for joint authorship, in the absence of contract.”). This position implicitly assumes 
that a valid contract altogether vitiates the need for a specific kind of intention accompany-
ing the collaboration, or indeed that it is dispositive of the question of intention, both of 
which are clearly not contemplated by the definition of a joint work. Indeed, the absence of 
the phrase “in the absence of contract” in that definition is indicative. See LaFrance, supra 
note 217, at 247–48 n.228 (describing the Aalmuhammed court’s observation as “troubling”). 
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simply put, cannot confer or deny a status that depends entirely on the 
law and its accompanying legal standard. Yet functionally the agreement 
nonetheless remains important. 
While authorship and coauthorship do carry important attributive 
benefits with them, recall that their primary consequence—at least inso-
far as copyright law is concerned—relates to the ownership/co-
ownership interest that they confer. Consequently, while the agreement 
cannot confer a legal status on parties without an independently deter-
mined objective basis for the status, it can nonetheless affect a transfer 
of ownership between the parties, as long as it is in writing.262 To see 
how this might work, consider two creators whose collaboration does 
not meet the law’s requirements for coauthorship, but who enter into an 
agreement wherein they agree to treat each other as coauthors and share 
ownership of the work. While they may not qualify as coauthors at first, 
and it would have been the case that one was the sole author of the work, 
the agreement nonetheless has the legal effect of transferring part own-
ership of the work to the other creator—in effect producing a relation-
ship of co-ownership. Similarly, two creators whose collaboration and 
behavior would qualify them objectively for the status of coauthors (and 
the work as a joint work) might agree that one of them is to be treated as 
the sole author of the work and retain all ownership rights over it. Here 
too, the agreement does not simply negate the status of coauthorship that 
the law recognizes, but as a functional matter, it has the effect of trans-
ferring one coauthor’s share to the other, creating a situation of sole 
ownership. 
The only situations where the Act contemplates a contractual ar-
rangement altering or conferring the status of author on a party relates to 
works made for hire. These are works specially ordered or commis-
sioned by one party as a contribution to another work or collective work 
in various contexts.263 The Act, however, insists that in addition to hav-
ing such agreements in writing, the parties must agree “that the work 
shall be considered a work made for hire” for the status to attach.264 
Once these formalities are complied with, the commissioning or order-
ing party comes to be treated by the law as both the “author” and owner 
 
262 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012) (requiring transfers of copyright ownership to be in writing). 
263 See id. § 101 (2012) (definition of “work made for hire”). 
264 See id. 
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of the work commissioned or created.265 Very few simple collaboration 
agreements or contracts would satisfy this high bar and explicitly identi-
fy the work as a work made for hire.266 Consequently, ordinary agree-
ments cannot have the same effect. 
In this sense, an agreement between authors or coauthors is not dis-
positive of their statuses in the abstract; yet functionally, it can indeed be 
important on the question of ownership, which is the principal conse-
quence of their statuses. Perhaps most importantly though, in situations 
where an express agreement does exist between the parties, the likeli-
hood of a court being called upon to determine coauthorship remains 
fairly minimal. Consequently, unplanned coauthorship as a doctrine is 
almost always invoked in situations where no agreement on authorship 
and ownership exists between the parties in question. 
*** 
In summary, courts applying the rules of unplanned coauthorship and 
searching for the requisite mutual intent should focus the inquiry around 
an examination of whether and to what extent the parties were motivated 
to create the work by the collaborative impulse. This will obviously en-
tail a fine-toothed investigation of the actual creative process in order to 
discern the parties’ motivations therein, and the possibility of intermesh-
ing subplans having influenced the final production of the protected 
work. Yet, the key lies in examining the collaboration on its own terms, 
detached and unmoored from the simplistic allure of the objective indi-
cia, which bear no direct connection to the analytical and normative 
foundations of the institution of coauthorship. As it turns out, the courts 
that did develop the objective indicia were sitting in appeal, and thus had 
little ability to further elicit information about the creative process. Their 
impetus to apply the simplifying indicia seems to have been borne out of 
an urge to avoid grappling with the complexities of collaborative crea-
tivity and parties’ motivations therein, an impetus that has resulted in the 
rules of unplanned coauthorship being viewed in copyright jurispru-
dence as a distinct anomaly. 
 
265 See id. § 201(b) (2012) (discussing ownership of copyright for a work made for hire); 
see also LaFrance, supra note 217, at 247–48 n.228 (discussing the work for hire interpreta-
tion of such contracts). 
266 See 2 Patry, supra note 50, § 5:76 (“An agreement that doesn’t expressly state that it 
shall be [a] work for hire is insufficient.”); see also 1 Nimmer, supra note 70, § 6.07[D] (dis-
cussing the relationship between joint works and the work made for hire doctrine). 
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D. Childress v. Taylor and the Collaborative Impulse 
Having examined the theory behind the collaborative impulse and the 
ways in which it might be translated into insights for copyright’s rules 
on unplanned coauthorship, this Section moves to illustrating the work-
ing of the collaborative impulse using the facts of Childress v. Taylor, 
the seminal case on coauthorship where the Second Circuit developed 
the current formulation of mutual intent.267 While the Second Circuit to-
day receives much of the credit for its ruling, the district court’s factual 
record on the collaborative process is rich in detail, allowing for a nu-
anced application of some of the principles illustrated in the previous 
sections.268 
The work in question was a play about Jackie “Moms” Mabley, a 
well-known African American performer.269 The defendant, Taylor, was 
an actress who had portrayed Mabley in different plays previously, and 
had developed an interest in producing a play specifically about Mabley 
and her life.270 She approached the plaintiff, Childress, who was a noted 
playwright, with her idea.271 Childress at first turned down the idea, 
since she was busy with other projects. But she later changed her mind 
and agreed to work on the play and to have the project completed in un-
der six weeks.272 While the parties did not have any “firm” contractual 
agreement in place, Taylor nonetheless paid Childress $2500 before the 
play was actually produced.273 The parties at the time did not sign an 
agreement, nor did they specify the work as a work made for hire. 
During the creation of the play, Taylor supplied Childress with an ex-
tensive amount of research that she had done about Mabley, her life, and 
connected ideas, all of which she had diligently collected from multiple 
sources.274 This research “consisted of phonograph recordings of per-
formances by Mabley, magazine articles, and tapes of interviews Taylor 
conducted of Mabley’s stepson and brother.”275 Childress however was 
 
267 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 
268 Childress v. Taylor, No. 87 Civ. 6924, 1990 WL 196013, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 
1990). 
269 Id. at *2. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 503 (2d Cir. 1991). 
274 Childress, 1990 WL 196013, at *2. 
275 Id. at *3. 
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the only one who actually wrote the script for the play.276 In writing the 
script, Taylor did however make suggestions to the script: 
[S]he suggested a particular scene in the Play, taking place in Harlem; 
the inclusion of a card game involving the three characters; descrip-
tions of several of Mabley’s personal characteristics; jokes used in a 
scene describing activities in a bar; and a suggestion that a scene be 
included of Moms performing in blackface.277 
Nonetheless, during discovery the actual markups of the play as used 
during the first production were produced before the court, and it was 
revealed that Taylor had only contributed “one line of script” to the 
play.278 
Following the creation of the work, Taylor attempted to enter into a 
contract with Childress, which would have treated them as co-owners of 
the play.279 Childress refused this arrangement and their relationship de-
teriorated.280 When Taylor produced another version of the play using 
another scriptwriter eventually, Childress commenced an action for cop-
yright infringement, during which Taylor claimed to be a coauthor of the 
work. 
As a threshold issue, the facts suggested that Taylor did indeed con-
tribute some minimal amount of expression to the work. As the Second 
Circuit, interpreting the record, noted, Taylor’s assistance involved “fur-
nishing the results of research concerning the life of ‘Moms’ 
Mabley . . . . [She] also made some incidental suggestions, contributing 
ideas about the presentation of the play’s subject and possibly some mi-
nor bits of expression.”281 The principal issue was thus mutual intent. 
Recasting mutual intent in terms of the search for a collaborative im-
pulse, we might thus begin by asking whether Childress and Taylor were 
each motivated to contribute to the work at least in part because of the 
other’s reciprocal contribution—such that we might say that they were 
both committed to producing the work jointly. 
From the very beginning, Taylor insisted that her research formed the 
basis of Childress’s writing. As the district court pointed out, the parties 
 
276 Id. at *2–3. 
277 Id. at *3. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Id.  
281 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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“were in frequent telephone communication during” the writing of the 
script, with the process best summarized as one where Taylor researched 
“while” Childress wrote.282 It is clear that the parties did not form inter-
meshing subplans at the level of expression, a reality borne out by the 
fact that Taylor does not appear to have contributed adequate original 
expression to the final work as such. Yet, as we noted earlier, such in-
termeshing subplans can develop when one party is motivated to pro-
duce expression based on another’s ideas or research, assuming that 
each party did at some point make an expressive contribution to the 
work. The question thus becomes (1) whether Childress was motivated 
to write the script in any meaningful part by Taylor’s research, sugges-
tions, and ideas, and (2) reciprocally, whether Taylor’s own contribu-
tions were driven in some part by Childress’s writing. 
The factual record certainly reveals that Childress integrated many of 
Taylor’s contributions into the final script during her writing. As dis-
cussed previously though, the mere integration of another’s contribution 
into the final work does not ipso facto evidence the existence of inter-
meshing subplans that are meant to be motivational to parties’ behavior. 
It is only when the subplans underlying the collaboration are substantial 
enough from both a quantitative and qualitative standpoint that they can 
be said to genuinely intermesh rather than just integrate. The factual rec-
ord and both courts’ descriptions of the parties’ testimony in the case 
suggest that the subplans, to the extent that they did exist, were neither 
extensive nor significant in qualitative and quantitative terms. Indeed, 
the district court went so far as to observe that Taylor’s “creative sug-
gestions” did indeed “fall far short” of what was needed.283 Her contri-
butions were thus found to be insubstantial, which weighed on the court, 
even though it lacked a legal basis for this fact to matter. Even though 
the Second Circuit did not address the question directly, its opinion 
leaves little doubt that it engaged in a direct evaluation of Taylor’s con-
tributions to the final work, which it described variously as “inci-
dental,”284 “minor,”285 and as mere “helpful advice.”286 All of this sug-
gests that while the parties may have indeed developed subplans of some 
kind, these subplans were never substantial enough to rise to the level of 
 
282 Childress, 1990 WL 196013, at *2. 
283 Id. at *5. 
284 Childress, 945 F.2d at 509. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
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an actual intermesh that could presumptively be motivational in their ac-
tions. The insubstantiality of the subplans underlying the collaboration is 
also borne out in the evidence suggesting that Taylor’s particular re-
search direction, approach, and data were not directly influenced or in-
formed by Childress’s actual writing of the play. In other words, Taylor 
seems to have done this research out of an interest in producing a play 
about a historical character and a desire that the play exhibit fidelity to 
that character’s life, but not at the behest of, or in furtherance of, Chil-
dress’s own contributions—once again, diminishing the plausibility of a 
meaningful intermesh. 
In addition, the absence of a collaborative impulse is buttressed by the 
contractualized way in which the parties approached their collaboration. 
The parties seem to have conceptualized their arrangement in purely 
contractual terms, with Taylor offering Childress an upfront payment for 
scriptwriting.287 While this does not automatically negate the presence of 
a collaborative impulse,288 it merits a closer examination of the effects of 
the formalized relationship on the parties’ behavior and motivations. 
Taylor treated the parties’ arrangement as one where she was commis-
sioning a specific work for compensation. Childress, for her part, pro-
duced the expressive component of the work almost entirely in isolation, 
and seems to have seen her involvement in the process as deriving from 
an obligation to generate an actual output (with a deadline determined 
by the other party). Both parties might have certainly been motivated by 
copyright to create the work, and it certainly appears that Childress was, 
given that she registered the work immediately upon its creation.289 
Coupled with the absence of any affirmative evidence of a collaborative 
impulse, the arm’s length nature of the parties’ contractual interaction 
further suggests that neither party was motivated to create the work in 
any part because of the collaboration in question. 
While the district court (and later the Second Circuit) had sufficient 
evidence to focus on the parties’ possible motivations, it placed its atten-
tion elsewhere. Focusing on the collaborative impulse would have thus 
required no additional evidence to be presented, nor would it have im-
posed added adjudicative costs on the court and parties. If anything, it 
 
287 Id. at 503. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 259–61. 
289 Childress, 945 F.2d at 502. 
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would have given the court an analytical metric through which to scruti-
nize the evidence that was presented. 
CONCLUSION 
Hidden within copyright’s principal focus on the individual creator, 
unplanned coauthorship attempts to carve out analytical space for col-
laborative creativity as a distinct mode of cultural production. It remains 
premised on the idea that the collaborative production of creative ex-
pression is more than just the sum of each author’s individual contribu-
tion, and that the creative works that result from such collaboration—
joint works—are worthy of being produced and protected as an altogeth-
er separate category. Despite this reality, copyright’s rules on unplanned 
coauthorship have thus far received little systematic scrutiny for their 
compatibility with copyright’s goals and purposes, and as introducing an 
altogether different set of values into the working of the system. Indeed, 
courts have long considered them to represent something of an anomaly 
within copyright’s utilitarianism landscape and its dominant theory of 
creator incentives. 
Perhaps the biggest source of confusion with unplanned coauthorship 
originates in courts’ focus on “intention” as the touchstone of the in-
quiry. Yet, in failing to specify what exactly the search for intent is 
meant to achieve normatively, in adopting a multitude of conflicting def-
initions for such intent, and in utilizing a variety of simplistic shortcuts 
while searching for intent, courts have allowed this focus to come across 
as largely misguided in approach and mechanistic in application. This 
has in turn forced some to argue that unplanned coauthorship ought to 
abandon its emphasis on intention altogether. 
In this Article, I have shown that intentionality is indeed central to 
coauthorship as a collective activity, drawing on insights from the phi-
losophy of action. Indeed, theories of collective activity and group activ-
ity there have long argued that it is a specific kind of intention, referred 
to as “shared intentionality,” that renders such activities distinctive by 
imbuing actors with an independent motivation to participate in the ac-
tivity because of its collective/joint nature. Further, such intentions work 
by providing actors with their own reasons for action—referred to as 
commitments—that are distinct from ordinary desires, beliefs, and pref-
erences, even though they may often overlap descriptively. 
If courts’ emphasis on intention during the unplanned coauthorship 
inquiry is recast in terms of the search for a shared intention among the 
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putative coauthors, the inquiry begins to assume both analytical and 
normative significance. Unplanned coauthorship comes to be seen as a 
mechanism for protecting process-based motivations that are endoge-
nous to the collaboration itself, and which influence creative behavior. 
The search for mutual intent is in effect an examination of the parties’ 
motives during the collaborative endeavor, to ensure that it evinces a 
commitment to producing creative expression jointly, a hallmark of 
jointly intentional activities characterized by a shared intention. This re-
formulation of the inquiry is fully compatible with copyright’s utilitarian 
orientation. It operates as a form of means-oriented instrumentalism that 
introduces process-based considerations into copyright’s framework for 
inducing creativity. 
While scholars are right to criticize current copyright thinking for its 
single-minded focus on market incentives and rational utility-
maximization, the possibility of using unplanned coauthorship as a 
mechanism for introducing process-based considerations into the system 
should serve as an important point of introspection for copyright de-
bates. Perhaps the real problem is not copyright’s simplistic market fo-
cus or its purported commitment to an empirically unproven theory of 
incentives, but rather the copyright lawmaking community’s failure to 
meaningfully integrate new normative considerations and motivational 
realities into copyright’s existing doctrinal framework through a process 
of accretive growth within the system. Understanding unplanned coau-
thorship through the collaborative impulse represents a modest effort in 
one important area of copyright law where this might occur. Until such 
time as the “next great copyright act”290 changes our very understanding 
of copyright law and its purposes, thinking creatively and pragmatically 
about copyright’s existing concepts and analytical devices in this vein 
will remain essential. 
 
290 See generally Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 Colum. J.L. & Arts 
315, 344 (2013) (articulating a framework for a new copyright act and suggesting that “[t]he 
next great copyright act is as possible as it is exciting”).  
